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INTRODUCTION

Sport

is

not simply a

trivial activity

part of the culture of a nation

or a frivolous diversion

and a people. Over the past century,

used as a tool for both diplomacy and propaganda, a way to

new

it is

two

thing sport has never been

is

an important

athletics

settle disputes

tensions, and a force to both bring groups of people together and a

wedge between them. One
past

-

have been

and a cause of

way

to drive a

wholly unimportant. Over the

centuries, sport in the United States has evolved into an integral part of

American

culture and society.

newspaper

The evidence of this

in the country has a section

network television programming

is

is

everywhere: virtually every

devoted to sports.

A large portion of prime-time

devoted to broadcasts of sports contests; numerous

radio stations devoted exclusively to sports talk and broadcasts have not only arisen, but

have thrived
illegally

and

in terms

legally

of numbers of listeners; and millions of dollars are wagered both

on sports contests each

many more examples

year. If this

were not proof enough, there are

that could be cited.

Athletics did not always hold such a prominent place, however. In the early years

of European settlement of America, sports were primarily a reflection of customs brought

by

settlers

from

their

home

countries.

The wide dispersion of settlers and

1

the daunting

task of taming a harsh territory precluded the establishment
of a coherent sporting culture
for

many

1

years.

As
into

the decades passed and what

was once

a wild and unsettled region evolved

an established nation, the United States developed a unique sporting

culture.

Many

forces conspired in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to elevate sport
from

being looked
accepted.

down upon

Two

the workings of the

human body and

promotion of sport

for the

Our

scientific

the rise of industrialization in the

2

The evolution of the medical community

activities

becoming respectable and

of these forces were the increasing understanding within the

community about
United States.

as merely a frivolous diversion to

in

American

As

society.

waned, there arose new views

in the nineteenth century

helped the

Victorian attitudes disparaging strenuous

that sports

and physical exertions were positive

development of a healthy body. In 1872, Dr. Augustus Kinsley Gardner published

Children, in which he urged boys to engage in athletics as a

and moral decline. In the decades
of living a "strenuous

These new

life"

that followed,

to avoid sexual vice

Americans had examples of the benefits

from such admired figures as President Theodore Roosevelt.

cultural attitudes

encouragement of sport by

way

toward the body were further promoted with the

industry.

business leaders looked to sport as a

Eager to exercise control over

way

to

their workers,

encourage healthy amusement and

to

Benjamin G. Rader, American Sports: From the Age of Folk Games to the Age
17.
of Televised Sports (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004),
2
Donald J. Mrozek, Sport and the American Mentality, 1880-1910 (Knoxville:
1

The University of Tennessee
3

Ibid.,

Press, 1983), xvii.

24-25.

2

3

establish positive discipline and

working

4

habits.

As

businesses and industry established

company-sponsored teams, the groundwork was established

American

sports as the squad

In the years before

for example,

1

from one factory faced off against

its

"Massachusetts game" and the
society, the Civil

men from

their

that

of another.

860, sport remained primarily regional in nature. Baseball,

had not codified

American

for the provincial nature of

rules.

There were differences between the

"New York"

War changed

homes and bringing them

version.

5

Like

many

other aspects of

the nature of sport in the country.

together, certain sports

began

By removing

to lose their local

uniqueness. For example, baseball rules were standardized to a certain degree as

played in military camps.

was

it

6

Other forces helped to solidify the place of sport

in

American

society.

Technological advances, such as the expansion of railroads and the development of the
telegraph system, helped to both establish sport on a national basis while maintaining the

ability

of fans to follow local teams even as they traveled across the country to compete.

The growth of colleges and
were enrolled
and

its

universities also played a part. In 1904, 250,000

in higher education institutions.

increasing popularity

competitions.

it

reached maturity

its

attendance

at athletic

roots in the late nineteenth

in the 1920s.

Allen Guttmann,

Games and Empires: Modern

and

Journalism played a role in

Sports

and Cultural Imperialism

University Press, 1994), 73.

Richard D. Mandell, Sport:

A

Cultural History

University Press, 1984), 183.
7

rise in

life,

Ibid., 17-18.

(New York: Columbia
6

was evidenced by a sharp

of modern American sport had

early twentieth centuries,

5

Sport had long been a part of college

7

If the culture

4

Americans

Ibid., 184, 188.

3

(New York: Columbia

this, as

newspapers increasingly embraced the reporting of athletics. But what sealed
the

place of sport in the United States
baseball player

female

Babe Ruth,

star athlete,

was

the rise of individual sports stars. Athletes such as

football player

in the national consciousness.

this elevation in the place

of sport within American society, there was

never established a national sports policy in the United States. Although

American

the first

Mildred "Babe" Didrikson, captured the public's imagination. 8

Undeniably, sport had become entrenched

Even with

Red Grange, boxer Jack Johnson, and

politicians

and even presidents have been athletes and sports

many prominent

fans, there has

never been the equivalent of an office of sports ministry. With the exception of athletes
training for international competition as part of the

Olympic Development Program,

has been funded exclusively through private sources.

9

sport

In fact, there has been a consistent

public outcry against public support of sports franchises

when team owners have asked

for public funds for assistance in building sports arenas.

The

significant, although private, nature

interesting contrast with other nations.

athletics, the

relations.

Due

of sport

to the lack

in the

United States presents an

of governmental influence over

United States government rarely considers sport as a tool

in foreign

This thesis examines two cases in which American sporting culture came into

contact with the athletic cultures of two other nations during the Cold War:

Cuba and

China. In the case of Cuba, the United States chose to not use baseball in 1959 as a

of retaining a toehold on the island
northern neighbor. In China, the

tennis to signal the

8

9

US

that they

in the face

Mao

of a

new regime

that

was

hostile to

way

its

Tse Tung and Zhou Enlai effectively used table

were willing

Rader, 143-154.

Mandell, 275.

4

to

reopen diplomatic relations with the

West. In examining each case,

it

becomes

governmental purview prevented

it

clear that the place of sport outside of direct

from being considered as a diplomatic

tool

by the

US

government during the Cold War.

In

my

With respect

work,
to

I

Cuba,

have relied on a combination of cultural and diplomatic sources.

much

has been published about the cultural history of sport in

general and baseball in particular. Three works in particular stand out: Paula Pettavino

and Geralyn Pye's Sport

in

Cuba: The Diamond

Echevarria's The Pride of Havana:
Full Count: Inside

portrait

Cuban

A

Baseball.

0

in the

History of Cuban Baseball, and Milton Jamail's

Taken

collectively, these

of the cultural importance of baseball

to the

indebted to these authors for their exhaustive work

However, these books

society.

Rough, Roberto Gonzalez

are cultural

works paint a vivid

people of Cuba.

works and

who had memories of Cuban

relations

works: cultural studies of the importance of baseball

the

US

Cuba during

the Cold

War

and Cuba, and by placing baseball

10

Paula

J.

baseball

Although aspects of diplomacy are mentioned

between the United States and Cuba are peripheral

cultural studies of

of Cuban

an account of Echevarria's journey back to Cuba

and

participated.

deeply

largely ignore diplomatic issues.

is

Americans

am

at the grassroots level

The Pride of Havana, for example,
his interviews with individuals

I

in

to the

Cuba.

My

when

in passing,

main goal of these

work continues where

leave off by examining relations between

in this context.

Pettavino and Geralyn Pye, Sport in Cuba:

Diamond in

the

Rough

(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994); Roberto Gonzalez Echevarria, The
Havana: A History of Cuban Baseball (New York: Oxford University Press,

Pride of
(Carbondale: Southern
1999); Milton H. Jamail, Full Count: Inside Cuban Baseball
Illinois University Press, 2000).

5

Unfortunately, with respect to China, there has been far less written
about that
nation's sporting history.

Body for China: Sports

Still,

in the

I

have been able

Susan Brownell's Training the

to use

Moral Order of the People

's

Republic and Jonathan

Kolatch's Sports, Politics, and Ideology in China 11 to establish a historical perspective
on

Chinese

on the

sport.

These show the ancient roots of athletics

role of sport under

communist

YMCA in China in the early 20
in these years.

international

I

Additionally,

I

China and provide perspective
use several works on the

Century to establish the Western influence that existed

YMCA played an important part in opening up China to the

community and introducing Western

To more
society,

The

,h

rule.

in

fully understand the

sports to the country.

impact of the Cultural Revolution on Chinese

use Michael Sullivan's Art and Artists of Twentieth-Century China, Ellen

Johnston Liang's The Winking Owl: Art
Curt Kraus's Pianos and Politics

Over Western Music.

13

in

it

China toward the West

People

's

Republic of China, and Richard

China: Middle-Class Ambitions and the Struggle

Although these works do not deal with sports

to paint a vivid picture of the cultural

Revolution and make

in the

and

societal turmoil in

possible for the reader to

more

fully

directly, they help

China during the Cultural
understand the attitudes of

in the early 1970s.

Susan Brownell, Training the Body for China: Sports in the Moral Order of the
People 's Republic (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995); Jonathan Kolatch,
Sports, Politics and Ideology in China (New York: Jonathan David Publishers, 1 972).
12
Chih-Kang Wu, "The Influence of the YMCA on the Development of Physical
Education in China" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1957); Jun Xing, Baptized in
China: 19 19-1937
the Fire of Revolution; The American Social Gospel and the YMCA in
(Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 1996).
13
Michael Sullivan, Art and Artists of Twentieth-Century China (Berkley:
Owl: Art in the
University of California Press, 1996); Ellen Johnston Liang. The Winking
11

Curt
Republic of China (Berkley: University of California Press, 1988); Richard
and the Struggle over
Kraus, Pianos and Politics in China: Middle Class Ambitions
Western Music (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972).

People

's

6

For the diplomatic aspects of US relations with both Cuba and China,
the

Department of State

Bulletin,

I

draw from

Foreign Relations of the United States, and Documents

on American Foreign Relations. Additionally,

I

have utilized monographs on the

relevant diplomatic aspects of the time period, such as

Thomas

Paterson's Contesting

Castro,™ Walter Isaacson's biography of Henry Kissinger, 15 and several works on

Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai.

would be impossible

16

Although

to write effectively

cultural sources are important for this thesis,

War

about the Cold

it

without examining

diplomatic aspects of the time. The documents in particular reveal the internal debate
within the

US

government about how best

to deal with both real

and perceived

threats

from communism, while the monograph and biographies mentioned above delve

into the

important personalities of the time.

The

failure

on the part of the

of athletics during the Cold

US government to

War proved

detrimental in efforts to increase understanding

between adversaries and establish a basis for peace.
opportunity of hardball diplomacy

politics

by the Chinese helps shed

in

Cuba and

light

recognize the diplomatic potential

An

examination of the missed

the realized potential of ping-pong

on the way

in

which sports were, or could have

been, used in international relations during the Cold War.

14

Thomas

Paterson, Contesting Castro: The United States

and the Triumph of the

Cuban Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
15
Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon

& Schuster,

1996).

Shao Kuo-kong, Zhou Enlai and the Foundations of Chinese Foreign Policy
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Han Suyin, Eldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the
Dick
Making of Modern China, 1898-1976 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994); and
Hutchinson & Co., 1984).
Wilson, Chou: The Story of Zhou Enlai, 1898-1976 (London:
16

7

CHAPTER

1

HARDBALL DIPLOMACY

In

September 1959, the Havana Cubans defeated the Minneapolis Millers

seven-game

thrilling

series to claim their first ever Little

people of Cuba celebrated
team, there was no

this spectacular victory

way of knowing

that the

World

newly

installed revolutionary

title.

As

the

by the island's unofficial national

moment

represented the high point of an

almost seventy-year sporting relationship with the United
the

Series

in a

States.

In a matter of months,

government, led by Fidel Castro, would take an

increasingly radical course, which set up a diplomatic confrontation with the United

States.

The Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations responded

severing

all ties

The way

in

which the United States bungled an opportunity

minimum

US

to use a

War

foreign policy.

domestic politics and the perceived threat of socialism

Hemisphere combined

benign tool

in

a diplomatic back channel with a potentially hostile

revolutionary regime makes for an interesting case study of Cold

will see,

by

with the island - political, economic, diplomatic, and athletic.

baseball to maintain at the

we

to this challenge

to prevent the

American foreign policy

options. Despite differing political ideologies, baseball
the United States and Fidel Castro on

elite

in the

Western

from seeing

8

all

of its

was a common ground between

which the two sides might have been able

together.

As

to

come

Cuban Baseball History
Sport has long been an important part of Latin American culture and society,
with
the United States and

Europe having a profound

athletic influence

nations adopted sports from outside the region and

But these sports were not played

in

made them

own

of their

part

existing regional culture were accepted.

On

January

2,

culture.

an effort simply to imitate the outsiders. Not

North American or European sports were universally accepted - only those

rejected by Mexico.

Many

on the region.

American

football, for

1897, an exhibition

Although other sports had been widely embraced

in the

that

all

fit

into

example, was roundly

game was

held in Mexico.

country, football received an

extremely poor reception. Mexican newspapers derided the game as "rough as well as

game

savage, unpolished, and dangerous," and as "a

Baseball, by contrast, quickly

fit

only for cowboys."

became popular around

In 1827, a

1

890s.

By

this time, British influence in Latin

United States began to play a more active

first

documented Mexican game

in

1

ball

in the

games had

a long

group of British businessmen founded the Mexican

Cricket Club, which was an active organization until the decline

in the

and

the Caribbean,

case of Cuba, soon rose to the level of the national sport. Bat and
history in Latin America.

1

882.

role.

By

1

popularity of cricket

in

America was waning, while

Baseball appeared

890, the

in the

1

88()s,

the

with the

game was widespread throughout

2

the nation.

Baseball in

American

1

sailors

Cuba had

roots that went back even further.

brought the game

early as

1

860,

to the island. In 1887, the Philadelphia Athletics

William H. Bcezley, Judas

at the

Jockey Club (Lincoln: University of Nebraska

Press, 1987), 20, 56.
2

As

Ibid., 18-19.

9

toured Cuba, inspiring additional baseball interest in Cuba.
After the

went back

to

to

20,000 fans for their games. 3 The sport soon caught on and the

national championship took place in 1888. 4

game became apparent
cropped up

By

in the

as

words such

The

cultural impact of the

American

as jonron (homerun) and doble plei (double play)

language of the Cuban people. 5

the 1940s,

Cuba had evolved

into

an extended talent pool for

The warm Caribbean climate provided an opportunity
in the

professionals

America, the sport's popularity exploded, and Cuban club teams regularly

drew crowds of 15,000
first

US

Cuban winter

for

US

American players

ball clubs.

to participate

league. Racial attitudes and prejudices in the United States helped

transform Cuban baseball into an athletic contact zone between the two nations.

Because

racial segregation did not exist in

6

Cuba> baseball games on the island presented a

unique opportunity for both white and black players. Although African-Americans and
black Cubans were forbidden from playing against white players in the United States,

Major League
racist

all-stars

played with and against blacks in Cuba. Even the notoriously

Ty Cobb toured Cuba and played

against black Cubans.

7

By

playing outside of the

United States, whites and blacks were able to avoid the color barrier and play
o

desegregated games.

3

4
5

Beezley, 20.
Patterson, 49.
Ibid., 49.

6

Reference to the "contact zone" refers to areas of intersection between the
United States and Latin American nations where cultures come into contact with each
Louise
other, and each is influenced by the other. For more on this concept see: Mary
York: Routledge, 1992).
Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (New
7
8

Patterson, 49.

Pettavino and Pye, 26.

10

When Brooklyn

Dodgers' executive Branch Rickey sought a player

baseball color line, he initially considered the legendary

Cuban

Garcia was not the best candidate

to

be the

first

kill

break the

player Silvio Garcia.

gauge Garcia's temperament, Rickey asked how he would respond
a white man. Without hesitation, Garcia responded, "]

to

if

To

he were slapped by

him." Rickey decided that

black player

in the

major leagues, and

decided to go with Jackie Robinson instead. 9 Although he did not use a Cuban player

to

challenge American racial divisions, Rickey recognized the unique opportunity presented

by Cuba

to introduce

participate in the

Robinson more gradually

Cuban winter

By doing

league.

competing with white players, while avoiding

Cuban
their sport.

to integrated play

Robinson became acclimated

so,

racist

by having him

white fans.

to

10

baseball fans acquired a reputation for being extremely sophisticated about

They not only attended

followed American teams.

local

games

Many Cubans even

numbers, but also closely

in large

collected

American baseball

cards,

baseball magazines, and yearbooks of American teams. Technology also played an

important role

in the increasing

passion for baseball.

television sets and over 575,000 radios.

the United States,

The

made up

restaurant and club

owners

games per week from

9
10
11

in

1951

,

programming schedule on

Cuban winter league reached such
Havana

Cuba boasted over 14,000

Broadcasts of baseball games, both

a large portion of the

popularity of the

By

Patterson, 49.
Ibid.

Echevarria, 299-300.

I

1

Cuba and

the island."

a height in the 1950s that

petitioned the league to reduce the

six to three, claiming that they

in

number of

were losing business. The request

was

refused.

games

It

was not uncommon

for

Cuban

president Fulgencia Batista to attend

Although student protesters who rushed the

in person.

field

with banners and

fireworks frequently interrupted these games, Batista did nothing to stop them.

American player speculated

One

that the President simply did not consider these protests as

representing a serious threat to his regime. 13

The novelty of Cuban obsession with American
typically paternalistic attitude by the

US

press.

A

baseball

1954

was

treated with a

article in Life

Latin American baseball games as "barely controlled chaos," as

if

magazine described

one was caught up

in a

revolutionary mob. The article spoke of fans trying to overwhelm their team's opponents

with noise, using "crude cymbals" (pots and pans), foghorns, and whistles. The author

mentioned frequent
the cheap seats

perspective,

hit

- much

away from

was

like

fistfights in the stands

fans.

for

the rich. Finally, and perhaps

the article's focus

on a "bizarre" sign

barbed wire

most

that

lit

striking

to

keep fans

in

from a modern

up when a home run was

scoreboard pyrotechnics that have been developed for American stadiums

over the past two decades.

American

and the need

14

Six years

later,

Time took a similar

attitude

toward Latin

Instead of highlighting the fans' knowledge of the game, the focus

on the tendency by Cuban spectators

to salute

good plays with roman candles.

was

15

Regardless of the American media's attitude toward Latin American fans, Cubans

were accustomed

to a high quality

the 1940s. All four teams that

12

of play. Cuban baseball was an impressive

made up

the

affair

by

Cuban League (Havana, Almendares,

Pettavino and Pye, 36.

Don Hoak and Myron Cope, "The Day Batted Against Castro," in The
177.
Baseball Reader, ed Charles Einstien (New York: Lippincott & Crowell, 1980),
14
"Baseball With A Rumba Beat," Life, 22 February 1954, 136.
13

15

I

"El Beisbol," Time, 29 February 1960, 60.

12

Mariano, and Cienfuegos) played

Games were

oil'

off.

On

for the winter season.

owner of the team
at

a

a rotating schedule.

double-header would be played, followed by

for

Cuban

l

eague began

Former major leaguer Don

baseball player's paradise."

league salary

Sundays,

on Mondays. Virtually every game was sold

In the early 1950s, the

(

Havana on

in

held on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays, with
the players taking

Fridays and Saturdays

another day

Gran Stadium

in El

1

loak

I

to attract

16

out.

top-notch American talent

[oak wrote,

"Cuba was an American

was paid upwards of $800 per month by

which he played,

American minor

significantly higher than his

the lime. Other teams paid their

!ienfuegOS club typically paid players $1,000 a

American imports even

month

plus

$350

in

Cuban

the

The

better.

expenses. Additional

benefits included reduced rent on an ocean side cottage plus a housekeeper and a personal

security guard, special treatment at
17

American

ballplayers.

This

Cuban

casinos, and banquets held in honor of

American players got

not to say that

is

Fans on the island expected high-quality performances on the Held.

uncommon

lor

of the season.

Still,

had

an American player

Cuban
on

baseball

became

participate in the

to

be sent

was

home

not

in the

middle

Cuban winter

less than

Americans

that

Organized Baseball"

primacy of American baseball. Only

45 days

league. Although

in the

all

majors were allowed

to

Cuban-born major leaguers were

Jamail,22.

17
1

19

produce

so attractive to

their players lo preserve the

minor leaguers and players with

18

Tailed to

It

Cuba.

Ix

to put limits

16

who

a free ride in

loak and Cope, 176-177; bxhevarria, 305.

Echevarria, 307.

The term "Organized Baseball"

professional baseball

in

refers to the collective organizations

the United Stales.

combination of Major League Baseball and

In

other words. Organized Baseball

its

13

affiliated

minor leagues.

making up
is

the

allowed to play winter

ball, their

major league club was given the right of first refusal

to

prevent them from playing during the winter. Additionally, winter
league team owners

agreed to accept a salary cap for American players. This cap, however, was
frequently

exceeded by under the table payments, which allowed

months of work
States.

in

Cuba than

they were able to

players to

make more

for a

few

the rest of the year in the United

20

The 1950s became known
in

make

US

Cuba, but for Cuban players as

while Cuban players were paid as

as the

Age

well.

Salaries for

much

as $2,400 a month, depending on their skill level.

of Gold not only for American ball players

This was an extremely lucrative financial reward
teacher

made around $200

1

US

in

it,

Cuba -

fans, the

was not

Cuban

limited to the winter

the

Havana Cubans. Quickly

Havana club enjoyed

won

the league

title

each of the

existence and had the league's highest attendance.

The Sugar Kings were

great success in

Echevarria, 306, 304.
Ibid.,

years of

a farm club of the Washington Senators of the

304.

Jamail, 23; Pettavino and Pye, 36.

14

its

American

interest in the island, the Senators

unofficially enjoyed exclusive rights to talent scouting in

21

first five

22

League. Because no other major league club showed

22

the average

Florida International League. Competing against American-based franchises,

the Sugar Kings consistently

20

when

946, the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues sanctioned

nicknamed the "Sugar Kings" by Cuban

B

time

at a

involvement

the establishment of a minor league franchise in

the Class

players were capped at $1,800,

a month.

Baseball in Cuba, and the

months. In

US

Cuba

for

many

years. Driven

by the

tireless efforts

of scout Joe Cambria, there existed a

Havana and Washington,

DC

for

Cuban

ball players.

between

virtual pipeline

The culmination of this scouting

effort

came on

when

the Senators turned the only major league all-Cuban triple
play. Whitey Herzog of

July 23, 1960, over eighteen

months

after the Fidel Castro-led revolution,

the Kansas City Royals hit a line drive to pitcher Pedro

baseman

Julio

Becquer

for the second out,

who

Ramos who threw

to first

then relayed the ball to shortstop Jose

Valdivielso covering second to complete the play. 23

The Sugar Kings competed
from 1946

to 1953.

Senators owner Clark Griffith.

B

24

't

,

Maduro wanted

minor league baseball

in

the

team from Washington

to elevate the quality

and take the team

baseball. His long-term goal, however,

Sugar Kings, as we

for eight seasons,

'
>

Bobby Maduro purchased

level of the Florida league

minor league

League

Following the 1953 season, Cornell-educated Cuban businessman

and baseball aficionado Roberto

the Class

in the Florida International

to Triple

was not

A, the highest level of

to simply

Cuba. Rather, Maduro's express purpose

will see,

was

of play beyond

purchasing the

in

to put the franchise into a position

have high-quality

where

it

could

potentially join the major leagues.

Maduro moved

to sever all ties

between the Sugar Kings and

team, the Senators. Because the Senators

ground even

after the sale

allow Cuba to be

home

still

looked

at

Cuba

its

as their

former parent

main scouting

of the Havana team, Maduro believed that they would never

to a

major league franchise. He feared that

if

he maintained the

team's affiliation with Washington, the Senators would be afraid to lose their exclusive

Jamail, 119.

Pettavino and Pye, 36.
Echevarria, 336.

15

Cuban

access to

players.

Based on

National League to become the

this theory,

new

not have the same historical ties to

he approached the Cincinnati Reds of the

parent club for the Sugar Kings. Since the Reds did

Cuba

Maduro thought

as the Senators,

Cincinnati ownership would not stand in the

way of the Sugar Kings'

that the

potential future

elevation.

Still,

First,

there remained significant barriers to the Kings

Maduro had

to secure the team's release

becoming a Triple

A club.

from the Florida International League.

After intense negotiations with League president Phil O'Connell,

Maduro

reportedly

agreed to pay between $20,000 and $25,000 for the release. 27 Maduro then faced the

problem of being allowed
(IL),

widely considered

to

to enter Triple A.

his eye

be the premiere minor league

made up of northern

primarily

He had

clubs, league officials

circuit.

mid-way

this obstacle.

city

But because the IL was

were hesitant

Only a combination of luck, good timing, and a willingness

overcome

on the International League

The Sugar Kings were allowed

to

to allow

Havana

in.

pay helped Maduro

to join the IL

when Richmond,

a

between the northern clubs and Havana, joined the league. Havana was

then permitted to replace a Springfield. Massachusetts team that folded because of poor

attendance.

To

ease the transition,

travel expenses that

Additionally,

Maduro paid $60,000

would be incurred by each team when they traveled

Maduro gave assurances

that

Havana.
at the

28

Ibid, 337.

"Florida League Releases Havana," New York Times, 10 January 1954.
28
"International League Considers Franchise For Havana as well as Richmond
League:
Year," New York Times, 7 November 1953; Bill O'Neal, The International
27

Next

to

he would work to eliminate gambling

stadium and thereby preserve the purity of the game.

lt>

to the league to help alleviate

A Baseball

History, 1884-1991 Austin: Eakin Press, 1992), 155.

16

I

laving successfully negotiated the minefields
of Organized Baseball, the

Sugar Kings entered the International League
selling out the 35,000 seat El

and we get there,"

in

in

1954.

Gran Stadium. Maduro was heard

reasonable to expect that

(

[avana

a success, routinely

to say,

"One more

step

reference to his dream of bringing major league baseball to Cuba. 29

Although Maduro's vision may now appear

franchise.

The team was

I

I

unrealistic, in the

lavana might someday boast

its

own major

American baseball was experiencing what would

later

mid-1950s

l

was

league baseball

be called

its

own

iolden Age. Attendance and interest were high, and thanks to the end of World

top-notch talents, such as Red Sox slugger

it

War

II,

ed Williams, were out of the service and

back on the Held. Mainstream sporting publications, such as the newly created Sports
Illustrated speculated about the potential expansion of major league baseball.

1

lavana represented a natural location for a

article

new

club.

In 1954,

To some,

Newsweek published an

about possible baseball expansion. The previous season, new teams had gone

Baltimore and Milwaukee. Given Maduro"s purchase of the Sugar Kings and
elevation to Triple

A

status, the article put

forward

I

US

cities

vying

US

for baseball franchises.

10

borders.

One

29
10

cities that

would have made up

Pattern,"

Newsweek, 25 January 1954, XX

17

lavana stacked up

to live,

the Southern

Ixhevarria, 336; Patterson, 50.

"Changing

I

proposal for major league

expansion would have increased the number of leagues from two
geographic location. OIThe

their

lavana as a possible place for

expansion should major league baseball look outside
well even against

to

based on

League under

this plan,

Atlanta,

Havana boasted

Birmingham, and

By 1959,
one.

Louisville.

minimum

the smallest of

in three:

31

number of potential new leagues had been rcdueed from

eriteria in

three to

all

order for a eity to be eonsidered for a franehise. Kansas City,

major league

eities,

was put forward

population (51 5,000) and ballpark seating (25,000).
cities

minor league teams

expansion was being seriously eonsidered and Organized Baseball established

Still,

certain

the

better annual attendanee than

were actively eonsidered as

Minneapolis,

St. Paul, Seattle,

as the floor for both metropolis

A number of other

North American

potential expansion cites: Toronto, Montreal, Buffalo,

Denver,

New

Orleans, Dallas, and Fort Worth.

32

Given

the long history and popularity of baseball in Cuba, and the close relationship between

the island and Organized Baseball,

least as strong a case for

On

Maduro had every reason

to believe that his

expansion than a number of these other

between the

US

loved American baseball and baseball players.

minor league baseball and was holding

its

own

I

at

cities.

the eve of the Revolution, then, even as diplomatic ties

political events, athletic relations

was

were being strained by

and Cuba remained strong. Cubans

Iavana had joined the highest levels of

with

its

US

rivals.

There existed a

mutually beneficial relationship on the baseball diamond that had signs of potentially

evolving into one of lull-Hedged equality

major league expansion. Unfortunately,

and Cuba, these

when

athletic circumstances

if

I

Iavana was able to become the location for

like all other relations

were

to

between the United Stales

be thrown asunder after January

I,

1959,

Batista's regime collapsed.

31

Charles Einstein, "The Geopolitics of Baseball," The Reporter,

1

August

.

1955,45.
32

1

.

"Notes on the Third League Theme," Sports Illustrated

IX

I

June 1959, 31

Baseball and Revolution
It

would be

difficult to

argue either that the American public was unaware of

problems with the Batista regime or

As

early as the mid-1950s, popular

that the

1959 Revolution was entirely unexpected.

news magazines published

articles deriding both the

nature of the dictator's rule and the instability of his administration.

The Reporter^ called

US

the article criticized the

support for the

way

in

Cuban

A

1954

article in

leadership into question. In particular,

which Batista came

to

power - by undermining

the

beginnings of constitutional democracy and staging a coup. Additionally, The Reporter
questioned the regime's commitment to protecting

stamping out

Communism on

the island.

The

service to the idea of personal freedoms in

repress opposition.

coup was

likely.

It

concluded that

if

civil liberties

article

its

claims to be

claimed that Batista only paid

Cuba and thought nothing of using

Cuba's economic conditions were

But so long as the United States continued

Cuban people would remain

and

apathetic rather than agitated.

34

to

lip

force to

to deteriorate, a

prop up sugar prices, the

This situation was clearly

not a description of a desirable ally for the United States.

This article was not the

first

instance of speculation about Batista's eventual

overthrow. Over a year before the publication of The Reporter piece,

Report ran a story

entitled,

"Cuban

Revolt:

When, Not

If."

While

acknowledged some of the positive accomplishments of Batista's
of the sugar market, reductions

33

in

US News & World

this article

rule (increased stability

gang warfare, and improvements

The Reporter was a bi-weekly news magazine published

to United

in

New

Railways of

York from

1949-1968.
34

Reporter,

Oden Meeker, "Cuba Under

Batista:

H September 1954, 21-23.
19

More Apathy Than

Disaffection," The

Cuba),

it

too

saw

the roots of potential unrest in Cuba. Batista's increasing
reliance on

the police and military indicated popular dissatisfaction
with the regime. Although the
article did not

mention Castro by name,

outpost by rebels,

who would

Batista's tenuous hold

later

it

pointed to the July attack on a remote army

become known

26 movement, as a sign of

on power. That these rebels quickly gained sympathy gave the

reporter the impression that the majority of the

overthrow.

as the July

Cuban people supported

Batista's

35

Herbert Matthews, a reporter for the
influencing

US

public opinion about

Cuban

New

York Times, was significant

politics.

in

Matthews was not an objective

observer in his writing about the Cuban Revolution. In his memoirs, he described Castro
as one of the

two or

and concluded

three greatest and

that the

most positive figures

1959 Revolution was the greatest event

1910 Mexican Revolution.

36

Even conceding

importance and impact of Matthews' s writing.

newspaper with one of the highest
the

New

York Times published a

Cuba. During

this trip,

his bias,

American

in the region since the

front-page articles in the daily

circulations in the United States. In February 1957,

series

of articles written by Matthews

he spent time both

in

Havana observing

"Cuban

36

Herbert Matthews,

Revolt:

When, Not

band of revolutionaries. Matthews's

US News and World Report,

If,"

after his trip to

the Batista regime, and in

were contained a stinging indictment of Batista and high praise

35

history

one cannot simply dismiss the

He wrote

the Sierra Maestra mountains with Castro and his

stories

in Latin

for Castro.

He

14 August 1953,

42-45.

A World In

Revolution:

York: Scribner, 1972), 254.

20

A Newspaperman 's Memoir (New

found resentment among the Cuban people toward the United
States

"menace of a

for

1

mountains served

in the

to

convince him of the

righteousness of the rebels' cause and the probability of their victory.
Batista had no chance of defeating

them

militarily; that the

stumble on the rebels by chance and then wipe them

Movement continued
Matthews

backing of a

military dictatorship,' and an "old corrupt order." 37

Matthews' s time with Castro

to

its

also

went

its

were

to great lengths to reassure the

hate the United States.

interpreted in the

guerrilla tactics, they

US

The

rebels, he wrote,

as anti- Yankee.

Communist. Matthews quoted Castro

Still,

were

He wrote

Cuban army's only hope was

out.

So long as the July 26 th

virtually guaranteed victory.

American public

nationalistic,

that Castro did not

an attitude which was

Matthews maintained, they were

as saying,

that

"You can be

sure that

anti-

we have no

animosity toward the United States and the American people." Castro's only goal,

Matthews maintained, was

the establishment of democracy and the end to dictatorship.

Although the American media put

forth a positive

message with regard

38

to the

nature of the growing unrest in Cuba, the American government's view was colored by a

Cold War obsession with the spread of Communism and memories of previous Latin

American
Bermejo
its

lands,

revolutions.

into power.

The 1944 Guatemalan

Arevalo forced the United Fruit Company to rent out a portion of

and the company convinced the

control of Guatemala.

To

Truman and Eisenhower

37

Revolt,"
38

revolution had brought Juan Arevalo

US government

that

protect the lands and property of

Communists had taken

US-based corporations,

the

administrations took direct action against the Guatemalan

Herbert Matthews, "Old Order

in

Cuba

is

Threatened by Forces of an Internal

New

York Times, 26 February 1957, 13.
Herbert Matthews, "Cuban Rebel is Visited

February 1957, 34.

21

in

Hideout,"

New

York Times, 24

government, culminating
been

set

about

how

in a

CIA-backed coup attempt. 39

to deal with the specter of

In this

Communism

way, a precedent had

in Latin

America -

it

had

to

be confronted with subversion and military force by the
United States.
In a

Inter

1958 statement of policy

in

American Affairs Roy Rubottom,

Guatemala and
According

to

Latin America, Assistant Secretary of State for
Jr.

echoed the apparent lessons learned from

cast doubts about Fidel Castro's anti-Communist pronouncements.

Rubottom, the Soviet Union was actively giving aid

to Latin

American

nations to turn the region against the United States. Russia was using labor unions,
student groups, and the media to create chaos and break

down

the currently stable

conditions under Batista. Assertions of rebellion based on nationalistic principles had to

be examined

critically,

according

horse of political penetration."

to

Rubottom: "Communists use nationalism as a Trojan

40

Secretary of State Christian Herter,

during these years, took a similar line
Herter wrote that the

Communist

who

in his

served in the Eisenhower Administration

book, Toward an Atlantic Community.

bloc had greatly expanded

of arms. Cuba was taken over by "internal subversion and
external military aggression."

its

The Cuban Revolution, he

its

physical territory by force

infiltration,

believed,

and not by

was camouflaged

early stages. Castro used anti-Communist rhetoric and democratic principles to

the United States into a false sense of security about what he

39

Jerald

A

Combs, The History ofAmerican Foreign

was attempting.

Policy; Volume

lull

In the end,

II:

Since

1900 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997), 365-366.
40
Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., "Communism in the Americas," 3 February 1958,
Department of State Bulletin: 1958 (Washington: Office of Public Communication,
Bureau of Public

Affairs: 1958), 181-185.

22

in

though, Herter wrote, the Revolution was revealed for what

and driven.

was designed

It

These

attitudes

particular trickled

to serve Soviet interests, not

Communism

toward

down from

the top levels of the

of the Foreign Service. Earl Smith served as
January 1959
intent,

42

all

costs.

that the July

that Batista

US

was a

that Batista

businessmen

in

to

41

Cuba from 1957

to

be opposed by the United

to assess the situation in

US government

had

to

to

to

Cuba. In

keep Batista

have embassies

later

in

in

power.

"ruthless dictator," he

was

still

44

was

in

sharp

Although Smith

a better ruler than Castro

outlaw the death penalty. Smith blamed the United States
in order to preserve its place

45

Christian Herter,

1963), 8-10.

Toward an

Atlantic

Community (New York: Harper

&

Row,

m..

42

For a more complete and particularly compelling account of Ambassador
Smith's failures in Cuba, see Paterson, Contesting Castro, 109-121
43
Earl ET Smith, The Fourth Floor: An Account of the Castro Communist
Revolution
44
45

43

Havana, and had

to Smith,

took the reins of power.

extending sufficient assistance to the Batista regime

Havana.

to those in the trenches

better ally for the United States than Castro, mainly

when he

was a

because of Batista's decision
for not

to

America during the Cold War. This, according

contrast to the actions of Castro

acknowledged

government

in

public announcements of Communist

because he had never allowed Communist nations
therefore helped

41

and the Cuban Revolution

26 Movement had

1958, they concluded that the

Smith believed

inspired

Shortly after taking over the diplomatic post in Havana, Smith formed

an advisory group made up of

November

US

was - Communist

Cuban.

US ambassador

Long before Castro made any

Smith concluded

States at

in general

it

(New York: Random House,

1962), 161.

Ibid., 124.
Ibid., 98.

23

But these were retrospective assessments of Batista and Castro.
While he served
as ambassador, Smith did everything in his

power

to alienate Castro

and

to foster

environment of animosity between the United States and the July 26
Movement.
January 1958, Smith stated in an interview that the
that

US

honored international law and maintained law and

incapable of doing either.

Word of these

of Havana-educated attorney,

toward

his

movement.

46

who

Even

In

could only deal with governments
order. Castro, he stated,

was

statements soon got back to Castro, a University

became convinced of American

in turn

as the July

an

hostility

26 Movement gained strength and popular

support throughout 1958, Smith consistently refused to speak to Castro. Smith claimed
to

be put off by Castro's remarks that there would be "200,000 dead gringos"

United States intervened
1

"disrespectful,

in the revolution.

Smith stated

'

useful purpose."

47

that a

meeting between himself and Castro would serve "no

had so poisoned the environment as
that Castro

to destroy his

would never

own

deal with

was triumphant, and Smith

usefulness to the United States in

him

in

any

sort

of productive

diplomatic manner. Smith offered his resignation to President Eisenhower.

accepted on January 10, 1959.

The period preceding

the

Believing that these remarks were

In the end, however, Castro's revolution

Cuba. Recognizing

if

It

was

48

the 1959 Revolution

was one of disconnect between

the

information that the American public received from the media and the attitudes of the

government. Given the depictions of the Batista regime and the July 26 Movement,
possible that the American public

may have been

Ibid., 60-61.

Ibid., 199.
Ibid.,

204.

24

US

it is

receptive to regime change in Cuba.

What was necessary was
government

to

a brave individual, or

go against the

tide of

Cold War

were continually driven by an obsession with
Because the stakes were raised due
States,

American

officials

to the

group of individuals, within the
politics.

the perceived spread of

were deathly afraid of any

least

to

Cuba:

Communism.

geographic proximity of Cuba to the United
sort of left-leaning

threatened their hand-picked right-wing dictator. This

diplomacy with regards

Instead, diplomatic decisions

that the State

is

the

movement

that

tragedy of American

first

Department missed an opportunity

to at

remain neutral toward an internally popular rebellion whose rhetoric promised an

improvement of

living conditions for the

own

mass of Cuban people. Although Castro's

pronouncement of

his

States and Cuba, a

more accommodating posture

may have

socialist nature precluded a close alliance

in the early

between the United

days of the 1959 Revolution

prevented the complete souring of diplomatic relations. Instead, the

to entrench itself further in the

later

US

chose

Cold War mentality and helped create an enemy only

ninety miles off the coast of Florida.

In the years

preceding the 1959 Revolution, Roberto Maduro had high hopes for

the success of the Sugar Kings. In terms of popularity in

I

lavana,

already familiar with the team's players from their participation
league. Additionally, the International League held exhibition

the Montreal

Dodgers and

the Rochester Cardinals.

novelty of American minor league baseball wore

Kings were not able
reasons for this drop

to

draw

the

crowds

in attendance.

that they

First,

49

off,

But alter

in the

games
initial

and by the

had hoped

many Cubans were

for.

late

25

in

Cuba

featuring

success, the

1950s, the Sugar

There were several

Cubans were accustomed

Fchevarria, 337.

Cuban winter

to baseball primarily

in the

form of the winter league. Despite

popularity,

its

it

was

difficult to sustain

enthusiasm for the sport year round. Additionally, Cuban
fans were used
talent.

all

The Cuban winter league

to top-notch

routinely attracted the best minor league players

from

over the United States. Although the International League was
one of the best minor

leagues, the drop in quality of play from the Winter League
difficult to attract fans to

rate talent.

games during

noticeable.

It

was

a non-traditional time of year featuring second-

50

Political unrest,

however, had not historically affected baseball

1952 coup occurred during the baseball off-season and
rebels

was

were situated mainly

Kings' games.
than the other

51

in Oriente Province, far

Cuba. Batista's

in the late 1950s, the July

away from Havana and

In fact, the rebellion in the late 1950s

way

in

26

the Sugar

was impacted more by

baseball

around. During the baseball season, radio broadcasts of games were

so popular that government troops often were reluctant to leave their barracks to fight the

rebels.

52

Although Maduro dismissed the danger posed by the rebels

"Why

the rebels are 750 miles from

concerned about playing

met

to decide

ball in

Cuba.

owners decided

to

April

7,

mountains,"

50

Ibid.,

American teams were

the International

to

League (IL) owners

J.

much

Cuba. After

go ahead with opening the season

scheduled. League president Frank

52

On

in the

what course of action should be taken with respect

deliberation, all

51

Havana

in April 1958, saying,

in

Havana

as

Shaughnessy summed up the sentiment by saying

339.

Ibid., 302.

Robert E. Quirk, Fidel Castro (New York:

WW Norton & Company, 1993),

183.
53

It is

for effect.

likely that

Maduro was exaggerating

"League Confirms Opener

in

Havana,"

26

the geographic distance from

New

Havana

York Times, 7 April 1958, 32.

that

games would continue

change."

people

When

down

to

be played

Havana, "unless conditions materially

in

asked what would constitute a material change, he responded,
"Shooting

there."

54
It

was

clear from this remark that although Organized Baseball

professed a commitment to continue play

in

Cuba, there remained significant concerns

about the physical safety of players, coaches, and others involved with the
games.

The unanimous decision by

the league

owners represented a reversal on the

of Buffalo owner John Stiglmeirer, whose team was scheduled
Havana.

Initially,

I

to

open the IL season

in

Stiglmeirer had been worried about his team being used as "guinea

pigs" to see if the situation in

he appeared

to

part

Havana was

truly dangerous.

have been convinced by Maduro

However,

after the meeting,

that despite the fighting in Orientc,

lavana remained safe.

A week
players

who

later,

however, Stiglmeirer changed his mind yet again. Persuaded by his

expressed trepidation over the ongoing revolution, the Buffalo owner

informed IL officials

that his

Ambassador Smith and

team would not play. Despite assurances of safety from

the threat of financial penalties ($2,000 fine, loss of a $25,000
j

bond, and loss of the franchise), Buffalo maintained that

it

would not

play.

Maduro 's

response was that although the conditions were safe, his team would be happy

wins via

forfeit.

5 ''

In the end,

to get four

however, play continued as planned. Shaughnessy made a

personal trip to Havana to assess the actual conditions on the ground and found the city to

be safe for the players. Reluctantly, Buffalo made the

54
55

56

New

"League Confirms Opener

in

I

lavana,"

New

trip

south and played the scries

York Times, 7 April 1958, 32.

Ibid.

"Buffalo Refuses

to Play Ball in C

uba Despite League's Threat of Penalties,

York Times, 14 April 1958, 30.

27

without incident. To prove that the conditions were
out the

first pitch.

safe,

Ambassador Smith even threw

57

Despite the increasing instability of the Batista regime and
the growing strength

of Castro and the July 26 Movement, Cuban baseball remained
unaffected by the
situation throughout 1958.

total

Although the Sugar Kings finished

last in the

political

IL standings,

attendance doubled to 178,340 for the season. Even the collapse of
Batista's

government on January

1,

1959 resulted

in a

minimal disruption

to baseball.

Only

five

winter league games had to be cancelled, while restaurants and nightclubs in Havana

remained

58

full.

Still,

as

Cuban

baseball fans celebrated Castro's victory and reveled in the

peaceful, carnival-like atmosphere of Havana, Organized Baseball

grew concerned.

Baseball Commissioner Ford Frick and Washington Senators owner Calvin Griffith

ordered

all

American players

to leave

Cuba and

not to participate in the remainder of the

winter league season. After receiving guarantees of safety from the

however, almost

By

all

players chose to remain, and finished the season without incident.

the time major league spring training started in

Organized Baseball was comfortable with the
string

new government,

March 1959,

political situation in

it

59

appeared that

Cuba. Because of a

of consecutive rainy days in Florida, Cincinnati Reds owner Gabe Paul called

Maduro

to see if the

the Dodgers.

Reds could make up some of its pre-season games

Maduro was

delighted to host the big league teams and

Quirk, 178.
Echevarria, 332.
Ibid., 332.
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in

Havana

Cuban

against

fans packed

the stands at El

play in

Cuba

Gran Stadium.

until the

It

was

to

be the

last

time any major league team was to

Baltimore Orioles traveled there

in 1999.

Organized Baseball's accommodation with Cuban

60

politics

was

however. In early April, there was a fresh outbreak of violence on
the
clubs expressed concern for their players' safety

if the

short lived,

island.

Several IL

season was to go forward as

planned. Frank Shaughnessy said, "If there's real trouble, we're not going to open but

want

to be sure."

61

I

In the days immediately following that statement, Shaughnessy

consulted with a number of individuals in Havana and received universal support for

going ahead with the season

in

Cuba. As expected, Maduro reassured the league

president about the safety of the

city.

But what appears

to

have been the most convincing

element was the reassurance that Shaughnessy received from Ambassador Smith. In a
release from the

American Embassy

play in the streets of the

Still,

city,

can't

63

series.

April 15.

the

61

62
63

62

in the

for the

team

for their entire stay

Bison dugout during the games for the

Despite these precautions, the 1959 season began without incident on

The opening game was an

first pitch.

bU

play in the stadium?"

A police escort was provided

Cuba, and detectives were stationed

opening

gown men

the Buffalo Bison players remained concerned and security had to be

increased around the team.

in

why

Cuba, Smith asked rhetorically, "If children can

in

international event with Castro himself throwing out

The US, Canadian, Mexican, and Venezuelan ambassadors were

Jamail, 122.

"Havana Play in Doubt," New York Times, 10 April 1959.
"Castro Makes a Pitch," New York Times, 15 April 1959, 38.
Paterson, 146.
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invited

onto the

field for a

pre-game ceremony. Fears of violence

virtually evaporated for the

next several months.
Shortly alter taking

Sugar Kings

the

make

to stay in

power
lavana.

I

January

in

1

le

(

959,

1

staled that he

sure that the team remained, "even

if

I

have

made

'astro

it

clear that he

would do everything

to pitch."

65

wanted

in his

power

to

Castro was perhaps the

1

Sugar Kings biggest
stands, usually

Ian.

It

was

not

at all

uncommon

accompanied by former Cuban

to see the rebel leader in the

Pedro Formanthael. 66

star player,

Fidel Castro's passion lor baseball had not always been limited to watching from

the stands.

In

I

(
l

>48,

In his pre-revolutionary days,

when

Fniversity

I

I

abilities

lis

found (/astro

to

soon drew attention from American scouts. Those

be polite and well spoken. In

pitched against a team of touring major leaguers.

he faced, including future

hits,

circuit.

he was a 21 -year-old college student, (astro was the star pitcher lor the

of lavana.

who met him

he was a talented pitcher on the Cuban

[all

I

of

l

ame

outfielder

le

I

I

November

l
l

)4S, Castro

struck out four of the sixteen batters

lank

(

ireenberg.

I

le

gave up three

but no walks and no runs. Castro's success continued throughout the University

season,

w here he was

wins and two

losses.

virtually unhitlable against local talent,

During the City

I

eague

that year, he

compiling a record of nine

continued

to

improve, putting

together a 12-1 record.

Although he displayed an excellent curvcball and

American scouts began

to lose interest iu

a strong fastball,

Castro after 1948, as he did not throw as hard as

64

"Castro Makes a Pitch,"

63

Bruce Brown, "Cuban Baseball," The Atlantic, June 1984, 112.

66

Hoak and Cope,

67

David

March 1989,

J.

Truby,

1

Mar

many

York limes, 15 April 1959, 38.

77.

"Now

Pitching for the Giants ...Fidel Castro," Sports History,

12.
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the legendary

Bob

The Giants were

Feller.

the one

team

to maintain interest, calling

him

a "serious prospect" and "stable." Scout Horace C.
Stoneham thought that he had a good

chance of making

it

to the majors.

The Giants offered Castro a

lucrative contract that

included a $5,000 signing bonus. The young pitcher pondered
the offer for a few days,
but turned

it

down. The Giants were stunned.

ever said no. Castro was, by the Giants'

wanted

to help people

own

It

was

the

first

time a Latin ballplayer had

account, very polite, but insisted that he

by getting his law degree. Baseball, he

In 1959, following the July

said,

They went back through

indeed the same

man

that they

Looking back, Stoneham

their records

no doubt

determination for baseball, he would have

and found

that the

fully

that if Castro

to play

from time

to time.

interrupted a winter league

He threw

three pitches to

made

it

Castro from years

new Cuban

leader

was

to the majors.

game and on occasion was

At one point during the 1959 Revolution, Castro

game and

strode to the pitcher's

to leave the field.

passionate about baseball and by

69

pursued a path that might have led him to play major

Don Hoak, an American

convinced the rebel leader

name

had had the same drive and

league baseball in the United States, he continued to enjoy the

known

68

had scouted and recruited almost a dozen years before.

said he had

Although Castro never

for fun.

26 Movement's success, some of the older scouts

within the Giants organization thought that they remembered the
before.

was just

many

70

To

mound, demanding

the ball.

ballplayer before the umpire

the present day, Castro continues to be

accounts, takes pride in the success of the

Cuban

national team.

68

Ibid., 16.
69
70

Einstein,

Ibid., 16.

Don Hoak and Myron Cope, "The Day Batted Against Castro," in
ed. The Baseball Reader (New York: Lippincott & Crowell, 1980),
I
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Charles
176-180.

On

Maduro met with Castro

April 23, 1959,

reiterated his earlier position that he

would no allow

in

Havana. The

Maximum

political unrest to drive the

of Cuba. Maduro and Castro held a press conference immediately
following

Leader

team out

their

meeting

at

Havana

franchise in the International League for the foreseeable future,
and to later have

it

which they announced

elevated to the majors

It

became

clear,

violence on the island.
2, the

were working

that they

to

a third league were formed. 71

if

however, that baseball could not be

On

July

1,

the

same night

72

street.

While

this

fully isolated

that the Bisons beat the

brother of a presidential candidate backed by Batista

Havana

develop a plan to keep the

from growing
Sugar Kings 5-

was gunned down on a

event did not have a direct impact on the ballplayers

themselves, violence spilled over to the playing field on July 24. That night, as Rochester

was playing Havana

in El

Gran Stadium, a celebration of the

rebel victory spiraled out of

control as shots were fired from the stands, hitting the Rochester third base coach and

grazing two other Rochester players. The

Cuba

game was stopped and

the Rochester club left

the next day, forfeiting their remaining games. Shaughnessy had to

convince the other teams

in the league to

make

the trip to Cuba.

Armed

work hard

to

guards were

assigned to the stadium, and increased security became the norm for the rest of the

season.

73

From

the steps taken by the International League,

and Organized Baseball were committed

to

it

appears that Shaughnessy

keeping the Sugar Kings

in

Havana, even

in

the face of violence.

71

http://www.baseballlibrary.com; "Havana

April 1959, 33.
72
73

Patterson,

1

67.

Quirk, 252; O'Neal, 162.

32

Team

to Stay,"

New

York Times, 24

Despite the shooting and the Rochester
close with

Havana

in third place,

forfeit, the

IL regular season

came

to a

qualifying the Sugar Kings for the playoffs. In the

first

round, the Sugar Kings beat Buffalo to advance to the
championship series against the

Minneapolis Millers. The

anemic crowds barely

first

two games of the

totaling 3,000 fans.

were played

in

Minnesota before

Because of cold weather, IL

remaining games would take place

that the

series

in

officials

decided

Havana. The response from Cuban fans

was overwhelming - over 100,000 Cubans came out

for the final five

games of the

74

series.

These games

at El

Gran Stadium were hugely

significant social events in Cuba.

Both Ambassador Bonsai, the newly appointed diplomat following Ambassador Smith's
resignation, and Castro attended the games. Bonsai's attendance

tension following an enthusiastic ovation

allow himself to be upstaged, thought
series that he

even watched games

it

five

when he was

the source of

and

six

in the stands)

American sentiment. Cuban

fans readily

The

series

was decided (with

by a dramatic game seven win by the Sugar

Havana team,

acknowledged

up of both Cuban and American players, and
of all players.

74
75
76

in the

from the Sugar Kings' dugout, giving

Kings. The win prompted celebrations across the island. But while Cubans
deal of national pride in the success of the

some

introduced. Castro, never one to

was too much. Castro became so involved

advice to the team's manager on several occasions.
Castro off the bench and back

was

Quirk, 260.
Ibid.

Echevarria, 342
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a great

this did not translate into anti-

that the

that their success

76

felt

Sugar Kings were made

was due

to contributions

Autumn

between the United States and Cuba.

relations

for the

1959, therefore, represented a critical

A

moment

in the history

of baseball

Cuban team met an American franch lse

most prestigious minor league championship and won. Cuban
fans were proud of

their national team.

Through

his attendance,

even the revolutionary leader Fidel Castro

acknowledged the importance of a Havana-based baseball team playing

in a

US

league

and spoke openly about preserving the Sugar Kings. The Havana franchise was
perhaps
the only

American

institution

whose presence on

also even

welcomed by Cubans. Whereas

condemn

other

Cuban

American

the island

was not only

the Castro regime

industries, such as oil, sugar,

tolerated, but

may have had grounds

to

and gambling, as exploiting the

people, such criticisms were never leveled at the Sugar Kings. Although the

Castro government took a far more radical course with regard to the United States in
1960, the athletic events of 1959 demonstrated that the Sugar Kings could have been a
positive and mutually beneficial presence in

Cuba even

in contrast to other

US

influences.

Political

developments

Cuba

in

raised serious concerns in the United States and

within Organized Baseball. In January 1960, barely a year after Fidel Castro succeeded

in

overthrowing the Batista regime, the International League held

its

annual meeting in

Buffalo. At this meeting, owners voted to give President Shaughnessy the authority to

move any team

during the season

at his

own

discretion, with Toronto

and Havana the

only franchises to oppose this resolution. Although the resolution applied to

it

was

clear that the Sugar Kings

were only team

34

likely to

all

IL teams

be transferred. Rumors

persisted throughout the spring that the Sugar Kings

because of the increased

volatility

of the Cuban

would be moved

political scene.

Instead of using baseball to improve relations with the
the

game was seen

as a

way

to

to

New

Jersey

77

new Cuban government,

undermine Castro's regime. At an April National Security

Council (NSC) meeting, the idea of broadcasting major league games to the island was

To advance US

proposed.

government was giving
In the end,

bring

its

policy and to discredit the information that the

people, American

NSC

however, members of the

down

the

Cuban regime, and

news would be broadcast between

first

the idea

pitch of the Sugar Kings

without incident.

was

in

79

1

innings.

decided that baseball was not the best way

was dropped.

The 1960 season began innocently enough, much
out the

Cuban

home

78

the

opener, and the

same

first

as 1959. Castro threw

few months passed

Castro recognized that the continued existence of the team

danger, however, and took steps to keep

it

in

to

Cuba. Shortly

after the

in

Havana

season

opened, he met with Maduro and assured him that whatever other measures the
revolutionary government might take against American property on the island, baseball

holdings were safe. Additionally, Castro offered to help underwrite debts incurred by the

Sugar Kings
offer

to put

- Castro was

them on a sounder

financial footing.

offering to open the

Sugar Kings' books were

in

Cuban government

This was an extraordinary

coffers to

good shape so they could continue

make

sure that the

to participate in

American

"Ibid., 345.
78

s

Meeting of the National Security
Council, Washington, April 14, 1960," John P. (ilennon and Ronald D Landa, eds,
Foreign Relations of the United Stales, 1958-1960: Volume VI - Cuba (Washington:

"Memorandum of Discussion

at the

441

'

United States Government Printing Office, 1991), 895.
79
80

Kchcvarria, 345.

Pettavino and Pye, 37.
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Organized Baseball. In
States

was not

way, the new Cuban leader's condemnation of the United

this

universal.

It

appears that Castro had

made

a distinction in his

between the Sugar Kings and other American businesses and
eager to preserve the

Although

Kings

in

Cuba and was

baseball presence.

insisting that

it

would do whatever was necessary

to

keep the Sugar

Havana, the Cuban government declared economic warfare against American

corporations.

the

US

interests in

mind

American-owned sugar

Cuban government. 81

plantations and oil refineries were taken over by

In early July 1960, Castro

announced himself to be a
I

Communist and stepped up

the process of nationalizing

once seen as a desirable location

for

US

American businesses. What was

corporations had

become

hostile

and dangerous.
i

By

the middle of the 1960 season, conditions had dramatically changed in Cuba.

American ballplayers found

that

US

currency was in high demand on the island.

As

they

flew back to the United States, the Buffalo Bisons saw thick black smoke out their
plane's windows.

the

The smoke came from American

Cubans when American

oil

companies refused

these fires represented the final break between

and months

tanks that had been exploded by

to refine Soviet

Cuban and

to isolate the island.

crude

oil.

In a sense,

the United States. In the

that followed, Castro aligned himself with the Soviet

responded by attempting

Cuba

oil

Union and the

weeks

US

American ballplayers would not return

to

for almost forty years.

For a more detailed discussion of American corporate involvement in Cuba and
the degradation of economic and political ties between the two nations, see Louis A.
Perez Jr., Cuba and the United States: Singular Ties of Intimacy (Athens: University of
81

Georgia Press, 1990).
82
O'Neal, 164.
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Despite Castro's continued personal guarantees of
player safety, IL President

Shaughnessy moved the Havana Sugar Kings

want

to

make

sure everyone

the time, and the

players alike.

move

is

safe."

apparently

Tony Castano,

to Jersey City

The team was on

came

on July

13, saying,

"We just

the road in the United States at

as a surprise to ownership,

management, and

the manager, and Reinaldo Cordeiro, a coach, quit the team

immediately and returned to Cuba. Napoleon Reyes took over as manager of
the team

and came under harsh criticism back home

Cuba

in

for his decision.

83

Given the

deterioration in diplomatic relations between the

US

how much of a

would have been naive

to

surprise the

keep the Sugar Kings

in

move

really was.

Havana given

It

and Cuba, one has

the hostility

to

to

wonder about
expect the IL

between the Castro and Eisenhower

governments.
International

League baseball proved

drawing 100,000 fans

in five

games during

to

be an abject failure

to last

•

season, the club

was moved again -

to Atlanta.

Cold War

The decision

to

After

the previous season in Havana, the team

finished last in attendance for the 1960 season with 47,900.

an improvement since they ended up next

in Jersey City.

The next season was barely

with only 61,940. Before the 1962

84

Politics

withdraw the Sugar Kings from Havana was part of a larger

policy toward the Castro regime, which in turn

Echevarria, 345.

O'Neal, 168.

37

was

part

of a

still

larger

Cold War

US

political scene.

5

The Sugar Kings were pulled out of Havana only days

Eisenhower announced

that the

US would no

effectively eliminating the sugar quota that

after President

longer import sugar from the island,

Cuba depended on

for

its

economic

survival.

Later in 1960, Major League Baseball Commissioner
Ford Frick prevented American
ballplayers from participating in the

The Cuban Revolution and
Cold War
as soft

politics during the

Cuban Winter League. 86

the Castro regime had

became fodder

1960 presidential campaign. Eager

on Communism, then-Senator John

F.

Kennedy

for

to avoid being

called for

offer the eventual

for "losing"

Cuba

presidential debate with Vice President Richard Nixon,

who

itself,

to the Soviet Bloc.

Kennedy

stated, "I

During a

wasn't the

presided over the Communization of Cuba." 88

Having won the White House

Kennedy could not

Cuba

ir

hope of overthrowing Castro." 87 Kennedy went even further and

blamed the Eisenhower Administration

vice president

viewed

American assistance

building up the "non-Batista Democratic anti-Castro forces in exile, and in

who

American

in part

on a platform of getting tough on Cuba,

easily take a passive stance

toward

political events

on the

island.

In

The degree of State Department involvement in the decision to move the Sugar
Kings has been a matter of some debate. Edward Boorstein contends that Secretary of
State Herter put direct pressure on Baseball Commissioner Frick to make the move.
However, Boorstein' s objectivity must be questioned as he is a self-professed Marxist
who left the United States shortly after the 1959 Revolution to work within the new
Cuban government. His writings are filled with anti-American vitriol, so without
supporting documentation, it cannot be assumed that there was in fact direct pressure
from the State Department on Major League Baseball. For more on Boorstein'
argument, see Edward Boorstein, The Economic Transformation of Cuba (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1968), 28-29.
"

86
87

Jamail, 123.

Herbert Parmet, JFK: The Presidency ofJohn

F.

Kennedy (New York: The Dial

Press, 1983), 45.
88

Philip

W.

Bonsai, Cuba, Castro, and the United States (Pittsburgh: University

of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), 171.
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April 1961, Kennedy's State Department
issued a pamphlet on Cuba, escalating the level

of inflammatory rhetoric.
the 1959 Revolution.

been perverted by

its

It

classified the actions of the Castro

What had

started off as

regime as a "betrayal" of

an effort to enlarge Cuban democracy had

leadership. According to this document, the

new government had

destroyed relations between the United States and
Cuba, and the island had been

transformed into a tool of international Communism.
concluded, represented the

first

modern

Castro, the State Department

totalitarian ruler in the

Western Hemisphere, as

witnessed by his regimes use of firing squads. The Cuban Revolution
represented an
assault

on the whole hemisphere, and needed

to

be resisted by the United

Evidence of this threat was other instances of civil disobedience

were

clearly influenced by Cuba.

In effect,

to the

Cuba

in

Kennedy's rhetoric during the 1960 campaign transformed Cuba from a

much

the

same way

political

The Eisenhower administration's response
for

US

policy toward

Cold War

as Republicans used

masses and manipulated Cold War

groundwork

America, which

89

serious, but primarily regional, concern into a top

using

in Latin

States.

Cuba

priority.

China

in

1952

By
90
,

essentially

Kennedy played

paranoia to boost his electoral cause.

to this raising

of the stakes helped lay the

not only for the next administration, but up to the

present day.

With

the loss of the Sugar Kings in July 1960, Castro could see the handwriting

on the wall and realized

89

that the

Cuban Winter League was

"Cuba," Department of State Pamphlet, April

3,

in

danger as well. Ernesto

1961, Documents ofAmerican

Foreign Relations -1961, 438, 445.
90
During the 1952 Presidential Election, General Eisenhower had effectively cast
aspersions on the fitness of any Democrat to serve as president, blaming the party for
"losing" China to the Communists. For a detailed discussion of this campaign tactic, see
Herbert Parmet, JFK: The Presidency ofJohn F. Kennedy.
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"Che" Guevara

tried to

undermine the State Department's influence over
Organized

Baseball by contacting American team owners
directly and offering them cash in

exchange for allowing

their players to continue to play in

unclear what Castro's goal was with this attempt.
a

wedge between Organized Baseball and

the

It is

Cuba during

the winter.

was

possible that he

American government or

that

It is

trying to drive

he simply

overestimated the ability of baseball owners to violate
government policies. In any case,
the effort failed.

On September

American players playing

television revenue

Cuba.

in

The Cuban League,
and had

1,

1960, Commissioner Frick announced a total ban on
91

therefore,

was

to recruit a

in grave danger, as

completely

new

it

found

itself at

a loss for

crop of players to replace the

Americans. Castro, recognizing the importance of baseball

to the

Cuban

people,

intervened and injected a fresh supply of cash to keep the league afloat. Additionally, the

recruitment drive for
the 1961 season

least

players went better than expected, and the quality of play for

was not measurably worse than

accounts. If anything,

At

Cuban

Cuban

fans felt

the season before according to

more passionately about

baseball than ever before.

according to public rhetoric, by having an all-Cuban league for the

baseball

became even more

to spite the United States,

highly of this

new

saying that for the

a source of national pride.

Cuban

first

They praised

was not due

New

York Times spoke

in the past, the

to a lower-quality

Echevarria, 346.
Ibid.,

by the

time in 53 years, Cuban baseball was free of US influence.

reporters claimed that the drop

92

time,

the loss of American players,

Although games were not as well attended as they had been

91

first

Perhaps putting on a happy face

sports writers interviewed

nationalist sentiment.

most

347-348.

40

Cuban

product on the

field.

Instead, they insisted that lower attendance

was due

to the fact that the

upper and middle

classes had lost property in the revolution
and were unable to go to games. 93

But

this initial success in the

post-US era of Cuban baseball proved short

Cuban

fans were accustomed to high-quality play featuring

talent.

When

it

became

games. Owners

clear that these days

filled the stands

lose face by playing

paying customers.

94

games

to

would not

some of the

best

lived.

American

return, fans stopped going to the

with school children and senior citizens

in order not to

an empty stadium. Very few of those in attendance were

The Cuban government soon took up

the cause of baseball, trying to

preserve the game's place in Cuban society. Using the slogan, "Be a patriot, and go to
the ball games,"

Reduction

in

it

attempted to help boost lagging attendance. Nothing worked.

admission prices (from the equivalent of $1 to 60 cents) and special ladies

nights did not improve the situation.

bring back the fans.

Beyond
split

Even Castro showing up

to

games

When

field so the

falling attendance,

Cuban

baseball faced other difficulties following

foul balls

game could

were

hit into the stands, fans

continue.

As

were asked

a last-ditch effort to keep

baseball afloat, players were asked to take a

25%

States,

Cuban

94

95

96

"Baseball

is

Dying

it

Cuba,"

in Castro's

Cuba," 2

in short

them

professional

island, the

96

Cuban government

York Times,

1 1

November

Echevarria, 350.

"Baseball

is

"Baseball

is

Dying
Aided

in

Cuba,"

New

York Times, 12 November 1960,

41

to the

to their advantage. Abolishing the

New

in Castro's

its

pay cut as a "patriotic gesture." Cuban

Recognizing baseball's precarious position on the
attempted to take control of the situation and turn

were

to return

labor unions even purchased box seats to improve the revenue stream.

93

person did not

95

from the US. Baseballs, formerly imported from the United

supply.

in

6.

1960, 2

Cuban League and

professional baseball in the mid-60s, the regime
declared that

victory, not a defeat for the island.

Using Marxist rhetoric

it

was

a

equating the trading of

in

players with slavery, the government declared that
the end of professional ball and the
creation of a new, amateur system represented "the
triumph of free baseball over slave
baseball."

Cuba was

97

The impact of the

loss of the

Cuban League and

devastating for the players. Those

cut in their income.

Most players

who remained on

either did not

United States and the promise of professional
families behind. For those

home

saw

to leave

a dramatic

Cuba

for the

did not have the will to leave their

ball, or

go back

to

the island

have the resources

Cubans already playing

clear that they did not have a real

professional baseball in

in the

United States,

it

soon became

98

to.

Castro's efforts to preserve baseball following the 1959 Revolution reveal the
cultural importance of the

quo

in

game

in

Cuba. Having

and

failed to maintain the status

terms of American-style professionalism, Castro turned instead to a more

communist-inspired version of the game.
apparently to continue the

this

tried

interesting to note that his first choice

It is

Cuban league with

capitalist influences.

Only

was

after failing in

attempt did he resort to a condemnation of US professional baseball in socialistic

terms. In this light, a missed

window of opportunity

for

US

intervention

becomes more

clear.

The end of professional

new amateur

baseball

marked

league was established under the

the start of a

name Beisbol

began with four teams and expanded incrementally
initially enthusiastic for

97
98

it

was

difficult for

them

Jamail, 29.

Echevarria, 351

42

to

to

new

athletic era in

Cuba.

Revolucionario. The league

twelve by 1967. Fans were not

abandon

A

their old loyalties to the

professional

Cuban League.

teams were placed
Eventually, the

played under

in

new

this

team

to

set-up

became entrenched, and

in the

to play a series

an avid baseball

Cuba continues

He

to take a

major league

the necessary visas

of State Henry Kissinger was opposed

to travel to

Cuba.

Still,

to allowing

he directed State Department personnel to

assessing the advisability of allowing American players to go to the island.

prevent any exhibition games.

memo

issue of travel by

Agency (INDER) about

American

ball players to

it

Affairs William Rogers, and

99

Ibid.,

chose

to

Cuban Government Sports

game

in

Havana

in late

March.

again appears as though Kissinger was the only individual

INDER Director Jorge

was no chance of holding

Jamail, 30.

100

still

revisited in 1975.

Commissioner Kuhn, Assistant Secretary

the game.

clear that there

Cuba was

the

the possibility of an exhibition

Examining the documents,

concluded that

100

Major League Commissioner Bowie Kuhn met with

became

all-star

from the State Department. Although

such an athletic exchange would be beneficial to both nations. Kissinger

who opposed

be

received permission from Commissioner

Citing the positive results from ping-pong diplomacy in China, the

The

to

United States did not forget about Cuba. In 1971,

of games.

fan, Secretary

American ballplayers

memo

rivalries.

system."

Bowie Kuhn, but was denied

draft a

baseball in

Gomez, manager of the San Diego Padres wanted

Cuba

expanded again, and

each of Cuba's 14 provinces to play off regional

Organized Baseball
Preston

In the 1970s, Beisbol Revolucionario

123-124
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Garcia Bango

the

game during

for Inter-American

all

favored

it.

After

the 1975 season,

it

efforts focused

on the following season. In the end, however,
Kissinger could not be

persuaded and these efforts were abandoned. 101

Recognizing the government's opposition

Organized Baseball began policing

wanted
as

to travel to

that

itself in the late 70s.

exchange with Cuba,

In 1977, the

Cuba. This time, the proposal never made

Commissioner Kuhn shot

baseball,

to baseball

down

it

year. In part, the statement read:

players

become

to the State

"No

as the

Kuhn

Department

is

permitted.

Cuba

When

is still

in effect today.

960, the baseball fans of each nation

Case, executive director of the

War

with Cuba.

US

still

Baseball Federation said,

at

respect each other. Dick

"We

need

to stop the

Cold

We need to break that barrier down and we can start with baseball."

Examples of the good

if

102

Although the governments of the United States and Cuba may have been
1

and

available, an orderly system will be created for the allocation of

player talent." This directive

loggerheads since

Cuban

directive later

discussion with anyone in

regarding the signing of any player to a professional contract

Cuban

York Yankees

himself. In response to growing interest in

Major League Baseball issued what became known

same

it

New

feelings toward the United States by

Cuban

103

baseball fans can be

seen in two incidents. In 1977, while participating in an international baseball

tournament, the
played, the

US

national

team played a game

Cuban crowd stood

your flag over us by

force, but

in silent respect.

you can through

101

in

Cuba. As the

US

National

Cuban

fan,

"You

Said one

baseball."

Ten years

later,

Anthem

can't raise

American

These documents are available online at the National Security Archive
(http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/). For documents related to Cuban baseball, see the
Electronic Briefing
102
103

Book under "Cuba."

Jamail, 125-126.
Ibid., 128.
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pitcher Jim Abbott,

who was born

with only one arm, played on the

US

national team.

While competing against the Cuban squad, one
observer commented, "Jim Abbott
popular that

him."

if the

Cuban government had any money, they would

is

so

erect a statue to

104

It is

difficult to

determine the condition of Cuba in 2004.

observers believe that Castro's government
for the

Cuban

people, but for

its

is

Some American

struggling to not only provide basic needs

very survival. There

"The three main accomplishments of the revolution

is

a joke that

are, as

is

told

on the

island:

Castro says, education,

medical treatment, and sports. The three main failures are breakfast, lunch, and
dinner."

the

105

Cuba was economically

Communist bloc

devastated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and

in the early 1990s.

Suddenly, the Castro regime found

itself in

desperate need of hard currency and export markets for sugar. The island developed an
increased dependence on tourism instead of trade to maintain

people

felt the

its

economy. The Cuban

pinch most profoundly through increased numbers of rationed goods and

higher prices for those goods that were available.

Recognizing the

difficult

economic

106

situation in

which he found

his nation, Castro

has tried to refocus the nation's energies on something that he believed Cuba could find
success in

-

athletics.

Even

as the

economic system was hurting, sports were put forward

as a shining beacon for the nation. Success

At

the

1

came quickly

996 Summer Olympics, Cuba took home

104
105

3

1

in international competition.

medals, ranking the island sixth

Ibid., 127.

Pettavino and Pye, "Sport in Cuba: Castro's Last Stand," Joseph

David G. LaFrance

eds, Sport in Latin

L Arbena and

America and the Caribbean (Wilmington:

Scholarly Resources, 2002), 147.
106

Ibid.
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overall behind only the United States, the
Unified

Germany, China, and Hungary. 107 Baseball
government

to stir

up nationalistic

pride.

Team

(the

former Soviet Union),

in particular served the

Cuban

needs of the Cuban

baseball players developed the

reputation for being the best amateurs in the world,
compiling an impressive record in
international competition in general and against the
United States in particular. But the

players were hurt by the
the late 90s, the typical

economy

Cuban

too.

The Golden Age of Cuban baseball was gone.

baseball player

made approximately $30

a month,

In

when an

estimated $120 was required to maintain simply a basic standard of living. 108

However,

athletic success alone

is

not sufficient to satisfy the population about

the success of a regime.

Economic conditions have created resentment

much of that

is

resentment

expense of other needs.
difficult to justify

same

in

Cuba, and

directed at the regime's continued funding of athletics at the

If current

economic hardships

persist in

Cuba,

it

will

soon be

government expenditures on sports development programs. At the

time, if athletes do not receive adequate compensation, the appeal of the United

States will continue to grow, particularly for baseball players.

defect.

More

athletes

may

try

and

109

(Mis)Use of Sport
Neither the United States nor Cuba has attempted to use the game of baseball as a
diplomatic tool to improve relations. Both sides have used the

literally so in the

game

as a

weapon -

case of the United States. In the 1960s, the Central Intelligence

Ibid., 148.

Jamail, 6-7.

Pettavino and Pye, "Sport in Cuba: Castro's Last Stand," 149. 154.
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Agency, aware of Castro's fondness

for baseball, unsuccessfully tried to
assassinate

by having him play catch with an explosive
metaphorical weapon. Castro looks

communication with the United
their

own game and

loudly

when

its

to

at the

110

ball.

game

States, but as

Cuba has used

not as a

way

to

him

baseball as a

open channels of

an opportunity to beat the Americans

at

prove the viability of his regime. The Cuban government crowed

national team defeated

American squads

in international

competitions

such as the Olympics and the Pan-American Games. 111

To resume

the level of baseball relations that existed in the mid-1950s today

would be exceedingly
trade

difficult for the

embargo against Cuba

it

would

effectively destroy the

that has existed for over forty years.

ended over a decade ago, powerful
population in south Florida)

United States, as

Although the Cold War

political forces (including the

insist that the

embargo remain

Cuban- American

in place.

In 1999, the

Baltimore Orioles traveled to Cuba to play a series of exhibition games against the Cuban
national team. Perhaps this trip has laid the groundwork for

of athletic relations between the two nations. Only time will

some

sort

tell if

of normalization

baseball can improve

diplomatic relations.

Looking back,

it

appears that the United States missed an opportunity to use

baseball to maintain a non-intrusive foothold in

the years leading up to Batista's

fall,

Cuba following

the 1959 Revolution. In

the United States established a positive athletic

presence on the island. Unlike other aspects of the relationship between the two nations,
baseball

was

the one area

where the

relations

were of equals. Games between American

and Cuban teams were not cases of one side exploiting the

110

Jamail, 9, 130

111

Ibid.
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other.

There

is

no evidence

to

suggest that Cubans believed they were being taken
advantage of by participating within
the structure of Organized Baseball.

baseball players into their country.
talents

of Americans and Cubans
For their

part,

American baseball
to

Havana, there

is

differently,

franchise,

much

baseball.

112

1

American

in the

clubs.

same way

is

every reason to believe that

that both

to a

if

events had

major league

Montreal and Toronto have. Cuban players

America. From 1947-1960, 135 Cubans played major league

great Cincinnati

baseball ties to persist after the

Cold War

players in

Sugar Kings were thought of in America as any

There

some Cubans continued

970s. Perhaps the most famous

to

Cuba and Cuban

Havana might have some day become home

politics.

US

and Cuba hurt

1

if

Cuban player from

this era

was Tony

959 Revolution, why did they not?
politicians in the late 50s

Perez, a

late 70s.

both the people of the United States and

American

athletic

to play in the big leagues as late

Reds teams (The Big Red Machine) of the

But the question remains,

down

in

Although the souring of relations between the

member of the

and appreciated the

alike.

that the

interchange after the revolution,

as the

their team,

Americans accepted both baseball

no evidence

happened

in

They supported

baseball and

leagues. After initial hesitation about the necessary travel time
to get

less than equals with

were welcomed

The Cubans welcomed American

Cuba wanted

The answer comes

and early 60s were

haunted by the specter of international Communism. Before Fidel Castro declared
himself to be a Communist, and even before he took any action that could be considered

112

Ibid., 10.

48

anti-American, the

Having come

to

US

government had decided

that he

was a Marxist and a

threat.

113

such a conclusion, politicians competed against
each other to prove that

they could be the toughest on this danger to
national security. This hard-line approach to
the

new Cuban regime may

not have turned Castro Communist, but

contributed to a hardening of antagonism between

Cuba and

it

certainly

the United States.

In this light, the Sugar Kings were a casualty of the
Cold War. Although Castro

recognized the team's importance to Cuba and promised that he would
do whatever

it

took not only to keep the team in Havana, but also to protect American
teams coming to

Cuba

to play

them, Cold

War

politics

proved to be too powerful

to save

it.

It

would have

taken a brave American politician to push the International League to keep the Sugar

Kings

in

Cuba. This baseball team could have been used by the

maintaining

at least a small, unofficial

presence in Cuba.

US

as a

way of

By keeping open

this

seemingly minor communications channel between the two countries and by allowing
continued athletic exchanges,

it is

possible that the Sugar Kings could have served as a

conduit to prevent relations between the

US

government and the Castro regime from

deteriorating as quickly and as harshly as they did.

Unfortunately, presidents Eisenhower and

Kennedy were not courageous with

respect to Cuba. Eisenhower had long neglected the island and had put incompetent

ambassadors

in the persons

of Earl Smith and Phillip Bonsai in charge of diplomatic

relations there. This policy of not-so-benign neglect contributed greatly to the overthrow

113

Roy

R. Rubottom,

Jr.,

"Communism

in the

Americas," 3 February 1958,

Department of State Bulletin: 1958 (Washington: Office of Public Communication,
Bureau of Public Affairs: 1958), 181-185.
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of Batista

in 1959.

114

Eisenhower believed

Having derided the Truman Administration
that he could

ill

For Kennedy, Cuba was a domestic

afford to appear

for "losing" China,

accommodating toward Castro.

political battleground.

By blaming

the Eisenhower

Administration for Castro's triumph during the campaign,
he effectively prevented

himself from seeking any sort of compromise with the

Kennedy was very aware
clear

how

that he

an effort to debunk

Laying blame on
believing that Castro

US

was

was widely perceived

this line

as soft

and policy makers

telling the truth

when he

said that he

team was allowed

if the

scant evidence to indicate that he

his political foes.

It is

of course, contingent on

is,

was

would protect American

to stay.

his blatant anti-American actions with respect to oil refineries

is

by

Leader. Additionally,

of thinking played into his Cuban policy.

politicians

player and the Sugar Kings' assets

Maximum

Even acknowledging

and sugar plantations, there

lying with respect to the Sugar Kings. Castro

understood the importance of this team to the country and even enjoyed watching them
play.

It is

hard to imagine what he could have gained from forcing them to leave.

contrary, if the

Cuban people had reason

for Cuba, his standing

So

in the end,

would have been

why

is this

to believe

he was responsible for losing the team

greatly hurt.

one minor league baseball team important? The Sugar

Kings are significant not only because they represent a missed opportunity
States to avoid

War
the

On the

for the United

making such an important regional enemy, but they show how

the

Cold

influenced diplomatic and political thinking. If we study the past to avoid making

same mistakes

in the future, there are valuable lessons to

potential of hardball diplomacy.

114

See Paterson, Contesting Castro
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be learned about the

CHAPTER 2
PING-PONG POLITICS

A

little

more than a decade

after the fall

of Batista

in

Cuba and

the end of US

diplomatic relations with the island, the world was shown in dramatic fashion

could be used to cut through Cold

War

come with

United States enjoyed a long history of mutually beneficial

of Communism, as was the case

in

sport

and improve relations between

politics

adversaries. This breakthrough, however, did not

rise

how

a nation with

whom the

athletic relations prior to the

Cuba. Instead, the diplomatic value of sports was

seen in China, a nation with an athletic past almost totally independent from American
influences.

As we
there

will see, although there

were some Western influences on sport

was never anything remotely approximating

own

the baseball ties

States and Cuba.

China developed

a model. In

while Castro attempted to develop his

fact,

its

in China,

between the United

athletic identity that did not look to the

own

US

for

version of American

professional baseball in an effort to compensate for the loss of athletic relations with the

US, China's path
influences on

its

after the

culture

In this light,

it is

Communist takeover of the country was

- including

sports.

important to examine

with regard to Sino- American relations while

Cuba. But even more important

in

a rejection of Western

why
it

athletic

diplomacy was successful

was never even attempted with

respect to

terms of American foreign policy during the Cold

51

War

is

that

Although

it

in

was not

the United States but

Richard Nixon, the

US

China who recognized the

had a president who believed

with China was a top foreign policy priority,

United States

who was

that

was China who was

it

potential of sports.

improving relations

the initiator and the

put in the position of reacting.

Roots of Sport
Athletics in China have a long history, dating back at least to 1267
year, according to legend, Chinese military leader

Western soccer

to

was

change

The

to

in

Huang-Ti developed a sport similar

to

promote training and teamwork of soldiers. During the Liang Dynasty

(502-557AD), the Shao Lin
goal

BC. That

style

of boxing developed as a series of movements whose

improve the health of participants.

1

China's athletic isolation began

1895 when the Young Men's Christian Association

(YMCA)

to

arrived in China.

YMCA was a Christian organization with a primarily missionary focus.

Missionaries were clear about their goal in China - to Christianize a previously

untouched nation. They used

athletics to help create a

more

physical labor in the regions in which they were working

the

as a

YMCA, there was
way

to

little

in.

positive attitude toward

Before the introduction of

or no physical education in China and the program

was seen

modernize China. Additionally, sport was used as a way of gaining a

foothold in areas that would have been otherwise closed to missionaries. The Chinese

1

and Ideology in China (New York: Jonathan
Chih-Kang Wu, "The Influence of the YMCA on the

Jonathan Kolatch, Sports,

Politics,

David Publishers, 1972), xix-xvi;
Development of Physical Education

in

China" (Ph.D.

1957), 59.
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diss..

University of Michigan,

people opened up to Western culture through sports and
were then more willing

to hear

about Christianity. 2

The missionaries introduced Western
the Chinese, as well as uniquely

American

evidence of basketball being played

Eleven years

Bulletin.

game, noting

that since the

compromise.

athletic

later, in

in

sports like baseball and basketball.

China

competing

3

In 1910, the

in track, soccer,

transition to

During

culture.

which was

tied

its

debut

at the

it

8-22, the event

was a

great success, with

4

off.

opening height. Noticing

Encouraged

to

introduction of American

that

Chinese

Sun's traditional queue of hair,

do so by other
to

win the event.

as basketball,

it

was

bar, a

athletes,

Chinese culture were witnessed

games such

traditional

Meet, Sun Baoxin, a high jumper, missed on

traditional

traditional

article in the Tientsin

Western sports occasionally conflicted with

Western sport and

4

1

in 1948.

and returned the next day

3

1896

and basketball. Over the years, other sports were

night, cut his hair,

2

1,

up on the back of his neck, was knocking off the

judge told him to cut

wear the

1

YMCA organized the country's first-ever Chinese

that first National Athletic

two attempts

his first

a January

first

weather was too hot for soccer, baseball was an appropriate

added, with table tennis making

The

is

The

1907, the same publication ran a story about a baseball

National Athletic Meet. Held from October
athletes

sports such as track and field and soccer to

5

Western event

Sun went home

that

Tensions between

in other

ways. With the

impractical for male athletes to

Chinese clothes such as long, loose gowns tied

at the

waist with a

Kolatch, 26, 30.

Wu,

89-90.

Kolatch,

8, 12, 14.

Susan Brownell, Training the Body for China: Sports in the Moral Order of the
People 's Republic (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 42.
5
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cord because they

made running and jumping exceedingly

difficult.

Also during these

years, the increasing influence and popularity
of Western sports gave a significant boost
to the anti-foot

binding

YMCA

The

movement

found success

for

in

developing indigenous leadership.

was widely accepted because

women."

China

in large part

because of

its

emphasis on

way, the organization's soeial gospel message

In this

the Chinese people

saw

it

as a

movement

of, by,

and

for the

Chinese people, rather than an imposition from outside. Historian Jun Xing
believes
the

YMCA can

that

be seen as a sort of forerunner of the Chinese Communists as the

Christian group primed the Chinese people to accept a message of serving the
people.

There were parallels

that

it

messages of both groups

education of women, and an end

literacy,

YMCA

in the

attempted to

was

make working

to

Still,

the dramatic

facilities in

the athletic impact

growth

in the

6
7

the

YM(

7

Although the

conditions better for the Chinese people, Jun argues

it

reached,

it

did not reach enough

8

on China was significant and can be measured through

use of private sports clubs. In 1912, there were 3,7X6 such

Shanghai. By 1916, that number had risen to 30,269. But more important

than the local impact,

In 1922,

in the

prostitution.

not a significant force in reshaping Chinese society as a whole. Although the

people to effect widespread change.

time

terms of promotion of rural

opium use and

organization was important for those individuals

isolation.

in

modern

was

that the

YMCA

helped bring China out

if its

self-imposed

China joined the International Olympic Committee (IOC)
(post- 1896)

Olympic Hra and attended

its first

lor the fust

IOC meeting

in

1928.

Wu,33.
Jun Xing, Baptized
'.

/

in

in the Fire

of Revolution; The American Social Gospel and

China: 1919-1937 (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press. 1996), 61-63.

s

[bid.,

123-124.
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In

1

932, China sent two athletes to the Los Angeles

summer games and followed

that

by sending 107 athletes

to Berlin in 1936, participating in traek,
soccer, weightlifting,

swimming, boxing, and

cycling.

In the

up

9

mid- 920s, sports increasingly became a
1

political issue in China.

With the

formation of the Chinese Communist Party came increasing
criticism of Western

Communists

influences. In 1925,

led the boycott of the Eight University

two of the participating schools were Christian missionary

Communists objected
had developed

in

to the

participate in sports.

Western "mcdals-and-trophyism" type of competitions

10

to believe in

opening up athletics so

that

that

to athletes.

everyone could

This would become a recurring theme for Chinese Communists.

ollowing the formation of the nationalist Nanking government

education became a national priority. The

new government

physical education from the private sector and

April 1929, the National Physical Education

were

Additionally,

China and raised questions about special privileges afforded

The Communists claimed

f

institutions.

Meet because

made

Law

it

in

1928, physical

shifted the responsibility for

a part of the school curriculum.

took effect, mandating that

all

In

children

to receive physical education with the goal being to bring about an "orderly

development'" and an ability to endure physical labor. Every city and town was directed
to construct its

By

own

sports facilities."

1937, there

people as preached by
revolutionary

9
10
11

was

a widespread rejection of the social gospel

YMCA missionaries and an

communism

among

the Chinese

increasing popular acceptance of

as being better suited to the needs of China. Christianity and

Kolatch, 21.

Brownell, 48.
Kolatch, 31-35.
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Communism became competing
before. Historian Jun

Xing

ideologies, not the

asserts that this

complementary forces of a decade

changing attitude did not indicate that the

Chinese people had become anti-foreign, but rather that
the
doing enough for China. The

rise

YMCA was perceived as not

of Communism promised to immediately address

YMCA only held out Christian gradualism.

Chinese needs while the

12

China was headed

toward a break with the West.

By

the 1940s,

China had undergone a tremendous

influence and direction of the
limited geographic way.

13

YMCA,

athletic evolution.

Western sport took hold and flourished,

its

athletic isolation.

But along with

this cultural

modernization came the seeds of an anti-Western national policy. The
for Chinese

Communists who

in turn

athletics as

important part of working class
the people through organized

ultimate goal

was

to,

that

was

all.

13

new government,

led by

life,

mass

and the government encouraged physical

participation in sports. According to

Mao,

In this way, they

to create a

hoped

"mass physical

of

the
14

culture," with access

to inspire a collective spirit

among

the people

development of socialism. But there was another, more

Xing, 167-169.

Western sport was only popular

in the regions

where the

YMCA had a strong

presence.
14

Mao

activity

"Promote physical culture and build up the people's health."

essential for the

12

in 1949, the

an integral part of the nation's culture. Sports were an

The Chinese Communists wanted
to athletics for

to hardships facing the country.

Communist takeover of China

Tse Tung, supported

YMCA paved the

promised the Chinese people a more

immediate and internally developed solution
After the

albeit in a

China entered the international sporting community through

the Olympics, effectively ending

way

Under the

Sports in China (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1973), foreword.
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practical purpose for the role of sport in

Mao's government: by encouraging physical

health and strength of the people, athletics

emphasis can be seen

in the

way

in

which

became
athletics

were depicted by the Communists - as ways
collective attitude that

the only sport that

the

would make

in

such as track and

make China

field

and soccer

strong and to develop

the nation safe from outside threats. Significantly,

was not put forward

most publicized game

to

part of China's national defense. This

in this

combative manner was table

tennis.

Mainland China, but was not regarded as being

It

was

part of

China's national security. 15 Table tennis was viewed exclusively as a recreational
activity, not as a sport

sports and table tennis

of physical strength. The distinction between the majority of other
is

In the early years

competitions changed

important for diplomatic relations.

of Chinese Communist

little.

rule, attitudes

Athletic successes, particularly on the international stage,

were seen by the Communist regime as bringing glory
to

world records held by Chinese athletes

weightlifting.

in

to

China.

socialism. Therefore, competitive spirit

to believe that

was derided

"Kolatch, 94, 135.
17

Sports in China, foreword.

Brownell, 302.
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began

to

an emphasis on winning over

for

was inappropriate

being a

and anyone who advocated winning was denounced.

16

quick to point

such sports as track, swimming and

participation reflected Western capitalist thinking and

attitude,

Mao was

In the years preceding the Cultural Revolution, this attitude

change. The Chinese Communists came

mass

toward sporting

*k

in true

medals-and-trophyism"

Instead, the Chinese

government advocated a "Friendship

first,

competition second" mindset that they

believed would place their athletes on the
moral high ground with respect to the West. 18

Sport was not the only cultural area in which the

remake China
Chinese

art

in a socialist image.

and music

to better

fit

Communist regime attempted

In the 1950s and 60s,

his concept of a

Mao worked

Communist

society.

to

to transform

The Cultural

Revolution was a direct attack on Western ideas and values
and was a distinct step back
into isolation for China. In the early 1950s, a large

number of wealthy Chinese

Mainland China for Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the United

Communist regime.

Still,

a

fled

States out of fear of the

number of artists and musicians remained

in their

homeland,

believing that there would be an expansion of employment opportunities
for them under
the

new government. The

Soviet Union sent musical stars and touring conservatories

throughout the country to perform. They played Western classical music, mostly Eastern

European, overcoming Chinese government fears that such music was dangerous. In

way, the Soviet Union was able

even

in a

Communist

to establish the

West

as a legitimate source of culture,

nation, lending credibility to Chinese musicians and artists.

The year 1955 was
government encouraged

the beginning of a change in Party attitudes toward

criticism of

Western

tastes.

this

19

art.

The

For example, Johann Strauss's

"Wine, Women, and Song" was deemed inappropriate

for a socialist society as

it

"rendered their listeners passive, devoid of political will." To correct the mindset of

Sports in China, foreword.
19

Richard Curt Kraus, Pianos and Politics in China: Middle Class Ambitions and
the Struggle Over Western Music (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 76, 79-80.
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musicians, performers and composers were
ordered to help with collective agricultural
efforts

by singing folk songs

to workers.

20

The Chinese Great Leap Forward was seen by Moscow
economic

policies. In response, Nikita

Khrushchev pulled

all

as a repudiation of Soviet

Soviet technical advisors

out of China in 1960. This included musical
experts stationed in Chinese conservatories.

As

a result, the early 1960s were a time of increasing
criticism of Western music, with

Beethoven's symphonies as the main
that these pieces

distract the

target.

would not necessarily

While the Communist government conceded

restore bourgeois power,

it

argued that they might

middle class from problems facing workers and peasants. Instead of
these

"dangerous"

classics, the singing

of revolutionary mass songs such as

"We

are

Marching

on a Great Road," "People's Communes are Good," and "Revolutionaries are Always
Youthful" was encouraged instead. 21

Around

this time,

Mao upped

the ante of the Cultural Revolution and directed

attacks against artists and musicians. In a June 1964 speech,

Mao

said,

In the past fifteen years, the literary and art circles for the most part

.

.

.

had not

carried out the policies of the Party and had acted as high and mighty bureaucrats
...

In recent years they have even slid to the verge of revisionism. If serious steps

were not taken
groups

like

Dubbed

remold them, they were bound
22
the Hungarian Petofi Club.
to

the Socialist Education

Movement,

its

at

goal

some

was

future date to

to fight against the

bureaucratization of Chinese politics and reverse socio-economic trends that

were

revisionist

M

Ibid.,

83-84.

Ibid.,

110-113.

21
22

and might lead

to

become

new forms of capitalism. Two

years

later,

Mao

believe

Mao went

Club was the group that attempted to bring about a revolt
against the Hungarian government in 1956. Michael Sullivan, Art and Artists of
Twentieth-Century China (Berkley: University of California Press, 1996), 151.

The Hungarian

Petofi

59

further

and called on students

bourgeois ideas.

Deemed

the

to

denounce teachers and professors who maintained

campaign against the Four Olds

habits, old customs), units of students
called the

(old ideas, old culture, old

Red Guards marched through

the

country exchanging revolutionary ideas and searching
out anti-Communist sentiment. 23

These were

difficult

times for

many

in China.

The zealous Red Guards attacked

anything even remotely or tenuously Western. Even
clothing was a target for
revolutionary criticism. Tapered pants, pointed shoes, elastic
shoelaces, jeans, and white
collars

were dubbed "Hong Kong clothes" and subjected the wearer

Cultural Revolution fashion. If a

man had

to a lecture

long hair, he was likely to have

on proper

forcibly cut

it

as part of the short hair campaign. 24

Artists

were

in

no

better situation. Traditional art

was

totally forbidden.

There

could be no landscapes, birds, flowers, or paintings with impressionist influences.
Instead, art

Parallels

was

to be used for political purposes only, such as to glorify

Mao

were often made between the Chinese leader and Vladimir Lenin.

as a deity.

25

Mao was

often painted into scenes strikingly similar to settings of famous paintings of the Soviet
revolutionary.

might
State

still

Even

artists

who

appeared to display the proper revolutionary thinking

be condemned for pre- 1949 Western

Department exchange program led one

ties.

artist to

A visit to the

United States under a

be accused of being a "cultural

Ellen Johnston Laing, The Winking Owl: Art in the People

's

Republic of China

(Berkley: University of California Press, 1988), 48, 59.
24

in

White, Lynn T,

III,

Policies of Chaos: The Organizational Causes of Violence

China 's Cultural Revolution (New
25

26

Sullivan,

1

Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 281

52.

Laing, 66.
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secret agent for the

Europe

in their

Sino-American Cooperation Bureau." Some who had studied

younger years were declared "ghosts and monsters." 27

Efforts to reeducate artists and musicians intensified
in the mid-60s.

September 1965,
not to gather

artists

new

were required

to

their

material for their work, but as a

of these penalties was confinement

way

The
1

to a cattle

to

remake them

who
pen

did not

on

collectives.

Cultural Revolution

fall

soldiers,

in the

into line.

for sufficient time to

minds and make a written confession. Often, non-compliant

factory or farm laborers

By

spend half their time with workers and

revolutionary image. Harsh punishments befell those
lightest

in

The
wash out

artists forcibly

became

28

was a family

affair for

Chairman Mao.

In

November

964, he put his wife Jiang Qing in charge of the reform of Chinese music. Jiang

believed that Western music was politically unhealthy and told musicians, "Capitalism's

music

is

headed

traditional

for destruction,

to die

Chinese folk songs were not much better

Jiang turned

lyrics.

you do not want

much of her

along with the foreigners." But

in her

mind, as some had vulgar

crusade against Western music into a personal

vendetta, seeking revenge against her rivals in the theater world. Her most famous victim

was Sun Wizhi, daughter of Zhou

Academy and

for that she

was

One of the dominant

Enlai.

Sun had done

tortured and killed.

better than Jiang at the

Lu Xun

30

personalities of the Cultural Revolution

was

the Chinese

Premier Zhou Enlai. One of Mao's close advisors, Zhou served a dual purpose during the
Cultural Revolution - that of both a moderating and driving force.

27
28

29
30

Laing, 63-64.
Sullivan, 151-153.

Kraus, 135-136.
Sullivan, 154.

61

The Premier's

moderation served to gain support for Mao's
Suyn, a middle-of-the-road
Revolution],

it

must be

intellectual,

all right."

31

effort to

"Obviously,

Mao

China, millions of young people answered the
to

be cared

provided for them. That job
Cultural Revolution

was

for,

had

fell to

that the students

stepped

Zhou.

33

in,

to

call

to

first

for

it

society.

[the Cultural

shown with

the

Red

of communism

Zhou.

32

In providing this care, the energy of the

sustained.

would exhaust themselves,

Red Guard members

Zhou had

the party leadership. Although

it

was

Once

clear that unless

again, the

someone

government looked

mass meetings, pleading with them not

at

was imperative, Zhou

It

good and bad individuals - not

to fight against those cooperating with the regime.

Criticism of the bourgeoisie

was

told them, to distinguish

to

to

be

between

appropriate, but destroying their property and taking

money from banks was going
Zhou

in

and spread out across the nation.

indiscriminant in their efforts.

their

Han

Said

have food, housing, and other necessities

violence would spiral out of control.

He spoke

Zhou was

to critique the path

The violence of the Red Guards alarmed
hoped

if

Zhou's leadership was

Guards. After being given direction from

These zealots had

change Chinese

too

34

far.

often tried to save colleagues from the wrath of the

Sometimes, he would denounce the

target

Red Guards.

of the Guards himself in order

to get

on the

board that would pass ultimate judgment. Then, from his position on the board, he would
steer the decision

31

away from condemnation. Other

Dick Wilson, Chou: The Story of Zhou

& Company,

times,

Enlai,

Zhou

got potential targets

1898-1976 (London: Hutchinson

1984), 240-242.

Han Suyin, Eldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the Making of Modern
1976 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), 327
33

Ibid.,
34

329.

Wilson, 243.
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China, 1898-

reassigned overseas,

away from

the

Red Guards,

or even hid

them

in his

they were safe. At one point, the Guards
targeted Soong Chinglin,

and

tried to force her to cut her long hair.

leaders on the importance of

Sun.

35

Though Zhou was

Zhou intervened

Sun Yatsen and

later

able to save others, he

own house

widow of Sun

directly, lecturing

until

Yatsen,

Red Guard

presided over a 20,000 person rally for

was unable

to protect his

own

daughter

from the Cultural Revolution.

Between 1966 and 1967, Zhou held over one hundred meetings with Red
Guard
members. While he held firm
that

was meant

to chip

away

to the

Communist

line, his

statements to them had a twist

at theories that led to unrestrained violence.

witness to the Cultural Revolution, "Zhou Enlai led us out of hell.

one by one."

36

This attempted moderation, however, put

the Guards. But as the students attempted to bring

back. Attacking the

Red Guard

Zhou

him down,

He

Said one

fought the demons,

firmly within the sights of

the Chinese premier fought

for faulty class-consciousness,

Zhou

said, "I also

made

mistakes during the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth Congress, yet Chiang Kai-Shek had
orders for

was

my

arrest.

How can you say that am unrevolutionary?

able to escape the

,,3v

I

Red Guard's

With

that,

Zhou

violence and lived on to strongly influence Chinese

foreign policy for the next decade.

The Cultural Revolution,

Communist regime was

in a sense,

was a

burst of energy

whereby the

able to lash out against a variety of targets.

It

was opposed

to

things ancient because they were feudal, things Western because they were bourgeois,

Suyin, 334.
Ibid.,

336-337.

Wilson, 245.

63

and things Soviet because they were

revisionist.

38

The end

result

of the Cultural

Revolution, then, was a reestablishment of a cultural
isolation that had not existed to this
extent in over six decades.

Few

in the

West thought

there

was an opportunity

reestablish diplomatic relations with China in
any sort of productive way.
that

China would keep

itself isolated

from the West

to

Most believed

for the foreseeable future.

Diplomacy
This was the China that faced the United States and President Nixon
in the

late

1960s and early 1970s - a Communist nation that had only recently completed a
chaotic
process of cultural change that

left

it

isolated not only

from the West, but estranged from

the Soviet Union. Relations between the United States and China were at a low point,

with the

US

enforcing harsh trade restrictions, having severed

all

diplomatic

ties,

and

maintaining a defense alliance with nationalist forces on Taiwan. Prospects of an

improved atmosphere between the two nations appeared bleak
Richard Nixon, however, was one American politician
the United States had to

Nixon came

work toward

at best.

who

believed strongly that

reestablishing a diplomatic relationship with China.

to this conclusion long before

winning the White House in 1968. During the

1952 presidential campaign, when then-Senator Nixon was running as part of Dwight
Eisenhower's presidential
policies toward

ticket,

Nixon attacked Secretary of State Dean Acheson's

communism, blaming him

for the loss

Democratic presidential nominee, was, according

Kraus, 139.

64

to

of China. Adlai Stevenson, the

Nixon, a graduate of Acheson's

"Cowardly College of Communist Containment." 39
The next

Nixon made a

trip to

Asia and became convinced of the need

directly in the region to

show

Communist propaganda.
work.

year, as vice president,

that the

West was not

Communism

to confront

afraid of

China and

to undercut

Policies of containment, he concluded, simply

would not

40

While preparing

to run for president in 1968,

Foreign Affairs, further detailing what he believed

Nixon published an

to be the proper

US

article in

policy toward

China. In that piece, Nixon wrote that China represented an immediate
threat to Asia and
that the United States

had

to

come

to grips with that reality. In the short term, the best

policy

was one of restraining China, with

power

into the family of nations.

the long-range goal of bringing the Asian

The West could not afford

to leave

China isolated as

population represented such a large percentage of the world's people and that

it

its

would

undoubtedly have nuclear weapons someday. 41 Nixon believed that the only way to
achieve success in Asia was by maintaining a policy of "firm

restraint,

not reward" with

China. In that way, the Chinese would be convinced that obeying international rules was
in their interest.

community

in turn,

would be able

to pull

China back

as a progressing nation, not a center of international

Around
independently

39

The West,

this

same time, Nixon's

at a similar

into the

Communist

world

revolution

42

future chief foreign policy advisor arrived

conclusion with regard to

US

policy toward China. In a speech

Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon

(New York: Simon

&

Schuster, 1990), 110.
40

Ibid., 136.

41

Richard Nixon, "Asia After Viet Nam," Foreign Affairs 46 (October 1967), 17
in Louis J Smith and David H. Herschler, eds., Foreign Relations of the United States,
1969-1976; Volume I: Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972 (Washington, DC:

United States Government Printing Office, 2003), 1 13-125.
42
Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. 285.
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ghost written for Nelson Rockefeller
triangle with

Communist China and

relations with each

shared a

common

-

as

we

in

May

1968, Henry Kissinger wrote, "In a subtle

the Soviet Union,

test the will for

we

can ultimately improve our

peace of both." The US, Kissinger believed,

concern with China - the threat posed by the Soviet Union.
In

developing a strategic relationship with China, therefore, the
United States could realize
great diplomatic gains.

43

After taking office in January 1969, Nixon remained convinced of the
need to

improve

US

relations with China, albeit at a deliberate pace; but he

dramatic improvements

Nations membership.
Gaulle,
1

States

Nixon

stated in

China policy

have on the

44

rest

in

make

During a March 1969 meeting with French President Charles de

no uncertain terms

in the short

that there

would be no change

in the

United

run because of the potential impact such a change would

of Asia. However, he encouraged France

to maintain relations with

way

to begin to

draw China out

45

Even with

this caution, conflict

of a new China policy. Kissinger,

slow

hesitant to

terms of diplomatic recognition, trade, or support for United

China, not as a weapon against the Soviet Union, but as a

of isolation.

was

developed

in particular,

to support overly dramatic steps.

When

in the

White House over the formation

advocated a slower approach and was

informed by one of Nixon's aides about the

president's goal of visiting China before the end of his second term, Kissinger responded.

43

Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography

(New York: Simon

&

Schuster,

1996), 334.
44

&

Richard Reeves, President Nixon: Alone

in the

While House

(New York: Simon

Schuster, 2001), 55.
45

Smith and Herschler,

(Document

"RN

meeting with President de Gaulle, March

14), 64-65.
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1,

1969"

"Fat chance."

46

On

another occasion,

when asked

his opinion

on Nixon's China policy,

47
Kissinger replied, "Our leader has taken leave
of reality."
Opposing Kissinger and

pushing for more overtures to China was Secretary
of State William Rogers. Rogers
believed that China was too isolated from the world
community and that the
to

US

needed

open communication.
Kissinger eventually came around to a more activist point of
view on China, due

in part to a

memorandum by

Undersecretary of State Elliot Richardson, outlining the

benefits of lifting trade restrictions. Richardson listed several
barriers that

would

result in benefits for

US

ways of easing

diplomacy without helping China, including

allowing American tourists to buy Chinese-made goods and permitting
sell oil to

ships traveling to China. These steps, the

world that the

know

US

wanted

to

memo

no question

US

companies

contended, would

improve Sino-American relations and would

that they could not take the United States for granted.

There

trade

The

memo

let

show

to

the

the Soviets

concluded:

proposed steps would arouse Soviet
curiosity if not concern. The Russians would be reminded that they cannot take
is

that our taking the

us for granted in respect to our relations with China and that
in this case.

It

would point out

to

them

we

too have options

that better relations with the

only in Russian long-term interests but are also a two-way

street.

US

And

are not

the

Russians might thereby be encouraged to show a great willingness to be helpful

on some of the more vexing problems between us

4

Isaacson, 336.
47

James Mann, About Face: A History ofAmerica 's Curious Relationship with
China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 19.
48
Smith and Herschler, "Memo from the Undersecretary of State to the
President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, June 21, 1969" (Document 300), 786787.
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Five days

agreed

to

later,

Nixon

notified the secretaries of treasury and

commerce

he had

thai

Richardson and Kissinger's recommendations and
would ease trade restrictions

on China. 49
or nearly six months, however, these trade
measures were not publicly

l

announced.

was

the lime

in talks,

In

December 1969,

ripe lor a public

and although the

Secretary Rogers wrote a

announcement. The Soviet

talks

were not going

could be a diplomatic breakthrough.
restrictions,

relations.

well, there

An announcement

memo
I

effect

would

telling

was

still

by the

US

a

him

that

were engaged

chance

that there

about the trade

slate

of Sino-American

also serve our long-term interest of forestalling an

eventual more fundamental rapprochement between the
In conversations with

Nixon

Inion and China

Rogers wrote, would confuse the Soviets about the

"Such an

to

USSR

and Chin;

.50

Nixon, Kissinger reiterated Rogers' contentions.

If

Sino-

Soviet relations continued to deteriorate, the Soviet Union would likely invade China.

For Kissinger. China was a belter alternative than Russia,
less likely to

stumble into a war.

I

le

believed that

sophisticated, and not motivated by a drive for a

As was

anticipated by Rogers, Nixon's

trade restrictions

was

Ibid.,

Asian power was

leaders were smart and

war of acquisition."

announcement of the

lifting

of Chinese

not without international backlash. Taiwan, long concerned with

the threat of Chinese invasion,

49

its

in that the

was understandably nervous over

"National Security

Memorandum

17.

the possibility of close

June 26, 1969" (Document 302),

789.
M)

"Memorandum from

Secretary of Stale Rogers to President Nixon,

Duncombe,

December

Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1969-1976; Volume IV: Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade
policies, 1969-1912 (Washington, DC: United Stales Government Printing Office, 2002),
2,

1969" (Document 308),

in

Bruce

F.

S00.
51

Reeves. 169.
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ed..

Sino-American

In a

ties.

March 1970

Chiang Kai-shek, Nixon attempted

letter to

to

address Taiwanese fears. Recognizing Chiang's
distrust of China, Nixon wrote that he

needed

to see if a possibility existed to reduce
the risk

States and China.

which would

Improved

in turn lead to

would be no change

in the

relations,

peace and

US

of conflict between the United

he maintained, would establish understanding,
stability.

Nixon concluded reassuringly

that there

policy of defense of Taiwan. 52

In the months following the trade announcement, Nixon
used other nations to

gage the impact of US actions on the Chinese government. In October 1970,
the
President met with
that he

Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu. Ceausescu informed Nixon

had met with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai who

relations with the

that such a

US. Nixon, however, was hesitant

move would

upset Russia.

relations with both the Soviet

Nixon welcomed

the other.

him
the

to reassure Russia that

USSR.

He

told

told

to

him

go too

Ceausescu

far

that the

Union and China, and did not aim

the

Romanian

that

China wanted good

toward China for fear

US

wanted good

to play

one off against

leader's offer to be a go-between and asked

America's intentions were peaceful and not directed against

53

Satisfied that the initial lifting of trade restrictions had

gone well, the Chairman of

the National Security Council Undersecretaries Committee, John N. Irwin,

further steps to

that there

show China

that the

US was

would be a dramatic increase

serious.

52

Duncombe,
(Document 63).

"Letter from

Although there was no expectation

in either travel

travel, trade, export-import, currency control,

of trade, Irwin proposed

and Chinese cargo entry

RN to President Chiang

53

recommended

restrictions be

Kai-Shek. March 27, 1970"

Smith and Herschler, "RN Meeting with Romanian President Nicolae
Ceausescu in Washington, DC, October 26, 1970" (Document 79), 283-284.

69

that

completely

These measures, he wrote, would be important
symbolically as they

lifted.

would show

that the

On March

US was

15, 1971,

serious about improving relations. 54

Nixon implemented some of Irwin's recommendations.
That

day, the State Department announced that
travel restrictions to China were

longer would

Nixon

US

citizens

need special passport stamps

said that these measures

were necessary

China and America. Underscoring the
that travel bans

Department press

in the

officer Charles

No

In a press release,

improve communications between

China was now

a

in

on Cuba, North Vietnam, and North Korea were

remaining in place. 55 Also noteworthy
that State

fact that

to

to visit China.

lifted.

new

category was

explicitly

announcement of these new

Bray referred

to

mentioned as
policies

was

China not as "Communist"

or "Mainland" China, but as the "People's Republic of China," the

name

preferred by

Mao's government. 56
Later that month, the

were having

US

government got a sign

their desired effect.

that

its

overtures toward China

While receiving a former Japanese foreign minister,

Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai said

that a

relations with the United States.

Zhou

"sudden dramatic improvement
also noted favorably the

US

China's official name. The State Department report summarizing

is

possible" in

government's use of

this

meeting also noted

Duncombe, "Memorandum from the Chairman of the National Security
Council Undersecretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon, February 23, 1971"
(Document 322), 832-836.
55
"Last Restrictions on Travel to China Lifted, March 15, 1971," in Roderick
MacFarquhar,

ed.,

Sino-American Relations, 1949-71 (New York: Praeger Publishers,

1972), 250.
56

"Department Lists Steps Taken on Contacts with Mainland China - March

1971," Department of State Bulletin (April 12, 1971), 510.

70

1

5,

that the

Chinese would be sending a team

to the

Japan, but dismissed the gesture, thinking

The

first

Rogers were able

to use traditional diplomatic

groundwork

same time

military action against China. All of the

- through

no evidence

of time, Nixon, Kissinger, and
trade,

and

for reestablishing productive diplomatic ties

risk

of the two Communist nations

restraining the

US

USSR from taking aggressive

overtures toward China

China

to

overtures that

What was

came from a

to

come

totally

next, however,

in standard

was a response from

unexpected venue.

the late 1960s, the driving force of Chinese foreign policy

Zhou had long taken

came

Nixon Administration ever considered more unconventional

that the

to reach out to China.

By

what was

the lifting or easing of trade and travel restrictions. There

means

US

for

and China. Furthermore, they had the added benefit of driving a wedge

aligning against the US, at the

exists

in

57

measures (easing economic,

between China and the Soviet Union, reducing the

diplomatic areas

significant.

to China. In a brief period

travel restrictions) to lay the

US

was not

it

two years of the Nixon Administration were remarkable

accomplished with respect

between the

World Table Tennis Championships

was Zhou

Enlai.

a realistic view toward international affairs, saying in 1949, "With

respect to foreign relations,

we uphold

China's national independence and the principles

of independence and self-reliance." The premier wanted a foreign policy grounded in
reality,

not ideology, one that recognized the changing relations of nations to each other.

Zhou drove China

among
had

to play

an important role in international power

politics, to negotiate

other nations for the best possible outcome for China. In order to do that, China

to free itself

from

all

forms of outside exploitation and domination. Zhou believed

Kissinger, 708-709.

71

in

creating alliances based on a combination of
domestic and international needs, and not

simply a shared ideology. 58 This line of thinking
called into question China's
relationship with the Soviet Union.

The premier was convinced
flexibility,

overshadowed.

tied with another superpower, the nation

59

In 1968,

it

was apparent

August of that year, Zhou spoke out publicly

..."

60

Zhou worked through

visitors to China) to soften China's

US.

talks with the

to stand next to

61

Mao

Still,

to

St.

59

Ibid.,

62
63

USSR against the

Czech

image and make

was

it

clear that he

during a

rally.

By

willing to reopen

Life reporter

Edgar Snow

allowing an American reporter such

Zhou was sending a

sign to the

US

that

China too

move China

closer to the

ties

with either the

US
rival

US

at the

on

expense of its
63

this issue.

But

some questioned

ties to Russia.

in the end,

or Russia. Instead, he wanted

General

what Zhou

some

relations

Kuo-kang Shao, Zhou Enlai and the Foundations of Chinese Foreign Policy

(New York:

61

China

denounce the Soviet invasion

there were divisions within the Chinese government, as

wanted was not close

60

its

and professional

Lin Biao in particular emerged as Zhou's

58

was softening

foreign policy.

its

Zhou's desire

China

unofficial channels (journalists

intimate access to the Chinese leader,

had softened

to

During the summer of 1970, Zhou invited

Chairman

to Russia. If

would be dominated and

that the United States

of Czechoslovakia as "the abominable crimes of the
people

China was dependant on

which was impossible so long as China was anchored

were too closely

policy. In

that national security for

Martin's Press, 1996), 259-261.
264.

Suyin, 369.

Wilson, 274.
Suyin, 374.

Wilson, 276.

72

with each, but a distinct separation from both. Only
by walking this fine
believed, could China fully realize

Communist

bloc, within Asia,

its

own power and independence

and on the world

stage.

line,

Zhou

within the

64

This was the internal thinking of the Chinese regime leading up
to the 1971 World

Table Tennis Championships. With Zhou Enlai primarily directing Chinese
foreign
policy, the Asian

to the

power was eager

to step out

of the Soviet Union's shadow and reach out

United States. Events and opportunities typically thought

diplomacy conspired

to

to

be unrelated to

provide China with a chance to realize this goal.

Ping-Pong?
For many

in the

United States, table tennis seemed a strange game for high-level

international competition.

sport

was invented

in

Known

England

primarily by

in the early

20

th

its

trade name, ping-pong, in the

century.

By

the 1920s,

internationally and in 1926, the International Table Tennis Federation

it

US, the

had spread

was formed, with

England, Sweden, Hungary, India, Denmark, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and

Whales as

its

founding members. The

world championships were held the following

first

year in London with central European nations dominant.

65

In the early 1930s, table tennis spread to Asia and

sport, particularly in China.

Reportedly, every Lenin Club that

Chinese Communists had a ping-pong table

and Communism.

66

became an extremely popular

Starting in 1953, Asia

in

it,

th

emerged

as the

ed., "table tennis."

Kolatch, 82-83.

73

established by the

creating a connection between the

Shao, 156, 175-176.

Encyclopedia Britannica, 15

was

dominant region

for

game

international tabic tennis competition, with

China and Japan producing great

players.

But

with the onset of the Cultural Revolution, China withdrew
from international

The 1971 World Table Tennis Championships became

competition.

significant, therefore,

first

time

in

when China announced

that

it

would

internationally

participate in

them

for the

7

many

years.''

Prior to the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese had been a regular participant
in
international table tennis competitions.

did very well.

I

They

sent both

men's and women's teams and

Iowever, the nation did not send a team to the 1967 event, heeding Mao's

directive to the Chinese people to "concern yourselves with the affairs of state and carry

the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to the very end." 68

players had been the best in the world.

I

Iowever, as news of the horrors of the Cultural

Revolution spread to the outside world, many

China's best players had been

November 1970 Chuang
showed up

at the

killed.

These

Scandinavian Open.

the

China and the

US

in the table tennis

1956.

a parlor or basement game,

67

exile

from international

it

70

rd

athletics,

fact, the

it

was

in

rare

only previous time

World fable Tennis

Because most Americans thought of ping-pong mainly as

was

difficult for

them

to fully

grasp the passion Chinese

Encyclopedia Britannica.

68

Kolatch, 169-170.

69

Dick Mills, "They

Still

Swing a Mean Paddle:' Sports

1971), 32.
70

when

69

faced off across a ping-pong table. In

in

feared that

fears proved groundless, however,

two nations had faced each other was during the 23

Championships held

community

Tse-tung, a former three-time world champion, and Li Pu-jung

Even before China's self-imposed
that

from 1959-1965, Chinese

Kolatch, 169-170.

74

Illustrated (12 Apri

had for the
outlets

sport.

drew

parallels

popularity of the

table tennis

In writing about the

between table tennis and baseball or

game

in

several

American media

football to explain the

China. Additionally, some American writers speculated
that

was so popular

Requiring

World Championships,

in

China because

it

seemed made

for the

Asian physique. 71

space and only simple equipment, the sport seems suited to the
wiry, fine-boned Asian build, and persons of Asian descent
are on the teams
little

from

72
several non-Asian countries, including the United States, Canada,
and Australia.

By

1971, Mao's government had successfully tied table tennis to

Communist

teachings and ideology. Using Chinese victories in international competition to the

advantage of the Communist regime,

embodies

spiritual, psychological,

would be seen

reciting

Mao

Mao

wrote, "The success of the Chinese at the sport

and physical commitments." Often, the Chinese team

quotes before playing and their

sayings of the leader during matches.

between table tennis and other

73

sports.

But as noted

Whereas

home crowd would

earlier, there

chant

remained a distinction

sports such as weightlifting and track

were held up as demonstrations of the physical and

military strength of the Chinese

people and their ability to protect their nation, table tennis was seen almost exclusively as

being a symbol of the triumph of Communist ideology. During the 1971 World

Championships, one American player noticed

match looked

71

to the sidelines

where

his

that a

Chinese player

who was

coach was holding up a copy of the

Neil Amdur, 'Table Tennis, In China,

Is

Not

Just

A

Sport/'

New

losing a

Little

Red

York Times,

10 April 1971,5.
72

New

Takashi Oka, "World Table Tennis Opens, With China Again Seeking

York Times, 29 March 1971,
73

Amdur,

5.

5.

75

Title,"

Book. The coach then held the book

win

to his

own

heart,

and the Chinese player went on

the next four points and the match. 74

Athletically, there

were few surprises

at the

World Championships. Asian nations

dominated the competition, with the Chinese and the Japanese winning

up

title

What was

for grabs.

They went out of their way
the

to

unusual, however, was the behavior of the Chinese team.

to

be friendly to the other competitors, with the exception of

Cambodian and South Vietnamese

recognize.

75

The American

squads,

whose

players, in particular,

team's attitude toward them, and being
flattered that they

virtually every

would reach out

in

to the

countries China did not

were impressed with the Chinese

awe of the Chinese

US

team.

players' abilities,

were

76

This behavior, however, appears typical of the Chinese. In international table
tennis competitions, like the

"friendship

first,

World Championships,

competition second" approach.

77

the Chinese typically took a

In an interview at the

World

Championships, Lin Hui-ching, the vice-captain of the women's team, outlined the
Chinese thinking going

We

into the competition:

promote friendship among the sportsmen and
people of various countries. We place friendship above competition. We believe
that our wish will certainly come true through the tournament and what we learn
78
from players will be of value.

74
75

76

War

are at the championships to

Judy Bockenski, "Ping Pong Diplomat," Seventeen 30 (October, 1971), 174.
Takashi Oka, "15 Invited to Peking," New York Times, 8 April 1971, 1.
"Interview with Tim Boggan - 17/1/97," The National Security Archive, Cold

Interviews; Episode 15

- China (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/

episode- 15/bogganl. html).
77
78

Brownell, 303.
"31 st World Table Tennis Championships," Peking Review 15 (9 April 1971),

11.

76

This

comment

revealed the unique place of table tennis within the
Chinese athletic

culture: table tennis

was not seen

as an aggressive sport, but rather as a tool to increase

understanding between peoples instead of vanquishing an
opponent to prove the
superiority of

Communism.

What happened
invited the

next was a surprise to the entire world.

American team, along with

issuing the invitation,

Sung Chung,

On

several other teams, to visit

April

5,

the Chinese

Mainland China. In

secretary of the Chinese delegation, said, "

We have

extended the invitation for the sake of promoting friendship between the peoples of China

and the United States." 79 In addition

newsmen
China.

80

this day,

it

Canadian team.

since before the

0

player

Canadians were invited

country.

Oka, "15 Invited

80

Ian Stewart, "3

come

this invitation.

who was

Some

traveling with the

to China, she

a ride with the Chinese team to an outing

April 4.

79

to

of official

sort

asked

if

she

Others credit Glenn Cowan, the American team's resident

The next day, Cowan exchanged

Chuang Tse-tung. After

these exchanges, an invitation

gifts

was

at

Pearl

Farms on

with Chinese star

proffered.

82

to Peking," 16.

Newsmen

Enter

Red China

1.

81

Ibid.
82

US media from

1

who had ^wrangled"

11 April 1971,

Communist takeover of the

female American team player

to a

as well.

Mei Peninsula on

mainland China by any

remains unclear what precisely brought about

When the

come along

invitation to visit

first

have attributed the gesture

the

American

to

•

This was the

To

hippie,

were issued

to cover the trip, breaking a long-standing policy of barring

American delegation

could

to the players, three visas

Kissinger, 709.

77

for

Week's

Visit,"

New

York Times,

Six months after the original invitation,
that

Chairman Mao himself had made

idea.

83

stunned, but overjoyed with the opportunity.

to

go on the

historic trip.

told a group of visiting

Americans

the decision to extend the invitation despite the

Chinese Foreign Ministry opposing the

unanimously

Zhou

Regardless, the American team was

Team members

voted quickly and

84

In retrospect, there were signs leading up to April 5 that the Chinese
were willing,
if

not eager, to use sports for goals not traditionally associated with athletics. Less than a

year before, China withdrew from the

Lawn Tennis World Association

organization's decision to allow Taiwan to be a member. 85

Table Tennis Championships, China made

was contingent on

it

eve of the World

clear that their participation in the tourney

the exclusion of the Taiwanese.

community went along with

On the

because of that

the Chinese demands.

The

international table tennis

The president of the Asian Table

Tennis Federation agreed to keep the nationalist Chinese out of the organization and Roy
Evans, an American and president of the International Table Tennis Federation, barred

Taiwan from

the

World Championships because, "The [Taiwanese]

applications have not

oz:

been received

in the proper form."

The Chinese
wrote, "I

China

was

invitation

as surprised as

initiative

would come

I

still

caught the American government off guard. Nixon

was pleased by

to fruition in the

this

news.

I

had never expected

form of a ping-pong team.

that the

We

Schuman, "Chou Tells Americans Mao Made Decision to Invite US
Table Tennis Team," New York Times (7 October 1971), 4.
84
George Brathwaite, "My China Visit as a Ping Pong Diplomat," Ebony 27
83

Julian

(November 1971), 85.
85
"The New US Policy of Peking," China News Analysis 840
86

Mills, 32.

78

(7

May

1971),

1

immediately approved the acceptance of the invitation." 87
The State department

in

an

April 7 release echoed Nixon's pleasure: "Such an
invitation would never be issued
casually or without government approval. There can be
no question that this

is

meant

to

88
indicate at least a slight relaxation of their attitude toward
the United States."

President

Nixon received wide accolades

achieved through sports. In an April 10

New

Chinese was described as a direct response

for the diplomatic breakthrough

York Times

editorial, the invitation

to the Administration's

by the

"diplomacy of

smiles." If ping-pong players were allowed into China, the paper asserted, then other

Americans could not be

Nixon

far behind.

for having the foresight to

relations with China.

89

lift

90

Clearly, the

signaling a start of something

more

an expectation that an improvement

would

Later that month, Time magazine similarly credited
trade sanctions,

which

American media saw
significant than a

in turn led to

the table tennis invitation as

mere

in diplomatic relations

athletic

exchange - there was

between the

fully

aware of the significance of their

that the invitation represented a

States

US

and China

follow.

Although they may have been unlikely diplomats, the American

was

improved

and China."

91

trip to

"whole new

Graham Steenhoven,

China.

start for

Team

captain Jack

88

89

team

Howard

diplomacy between the United

the president of the

US

Table Tennis

Association, said that, "Our group feels our responsibility. Everyone

8/

table tennis

is

conscious of

Nixon, 548.
Terrence Smith, "Washington Pleased," Atew York Times, 8 April 1971,
"Ping Pong Diplomacy," New York Times, 10 April 1971, 22.

90

"The Ping Heard Round the World," Time 97 (26 April 1971),

91

Takeshi Oka, "Table Tennis Captain,"

79

New

16.

25.

York Times, 10 April 1971,

4.

said

,92

it.

Even

home by

if this

the

US

personal understanding of the trip was not enough, the point
was driven

State Department. Officials visited the

for

China and gave them guidelines about how

the

word "Chinaman." Perhaps remembering

to act.

team

prior to their leaving Japan

Players were told to avoid using

the controversy following the display of

black power signals by two African- American sprinters on the medal stand

Mexico City Olympics,
displaying clenched

For the most

team played a

series

Department advised players

the State

fists

or peace signs.

part, the

its

away from

93

Americans'

of matches with

to stay

1968

at the

trip to

guests.

China was a

love-fest.

The Chinese

Although the Chinese could have

defeated the Americans easily, they worked to keep the matches close, always careful to

avoid embarrassing their guests.
well.

The youngest player on

that the

team was able

This friendly attitude carried over to sightseeing as

the

American squad

to take pictures

at

age 16, Judy Bockenski, remarked

everywhere they went without having

taken or even checked. This degree of openness defied the

of

life in

a

Communist

nation.

95

their film

common Western perception

The lone African- American on

the

US

squad, George

Brathwaite wrote of the feelings of solidarity between the Chinese and black Americans.
In one hotel the team stayed

States

and drew a

parallel

in,

a poster illustrated the oppression of blacks in the United

between

that oppression

and the oppression of China by other

nations. Brathwaite even felt that he received longer and louder applause

92

John Roderick, "Americans Visit Great Wall,"

93

"Interview with

94

John Roderick, "Chinese Tact Lets

New

from Chinese

York Times, 13 April 1971,

1.

April 1971,
95

Tim Boggan -

17/1/97."

US

1.

Bockenski, 142.

80

Lose Gracefully,"

New

York Times, 14

fans than his teammates did because he

show

the top to

their feelings

was

black.

96

Some American

of gratitude toward China. Eighteen year old John

Tannehill of Ohio said that he believed Chairman

Mao was the

intellectual leader in the world, causing a great deal of

delegation. Fortunately for the

was bedridden
Still,

visitors.

for

there

players went over

most of the

US

greatest moral and

embarrassment

for the rest of the

State Department, he contracted food poisoning and
97

trip.

were disturbing aspects about China witnessed by

The poverty was noticeable

to all in the delegation.

Many

the

American

houses were nothing

more than a covering

for a

Community

were rickety and old with no heat or modern amenities.

hospitals

bed and often kitchens were nowhere

to

be found.

Additionally, there were anti-American signs everywhere, with slogans like "People of
the world, unite and defeat the

posed

US

for photos under this poster.

between Mao's

ideals

and the

aggressors and
98

A

realities

Time

all their

running dogs." The

US

team

article highlighted the discrepancies

of China. Despite the Chinese leader's

pronouncements of the lack of materialism

in his nation, the

people

still

desired status

symbols. Bicycles and wristwatches were sought after and cost a large amount of money

Still,

the article concluded,

"No

outright repression

is

apparently needed, since the

Chinese give every indication of working voluntarily, even zealously,

one observer

felt that

within the state."

96

97
98

99

to the point that

they literally had no concept of individuality, only of their role

99

Brathwaite, 90.

Roderick, 14.

Bockenski 174.

"What They Saw - and Didn't

See," Time 97 (3

81

May

1971), 27.

While the American team was touring China, President
Nixon moved
improve diplomatic

US

trade

relations.

On April

14, 1971,

he announced the end of a twenty-year

embargo against China, easing currency and shipping

said that he

wanted

Among

contacts.

controls.

to take concrete steps to increase the opportunity for

the measures

to further

announced were expedited visas

The President
US-Chinese

for visitors

from the

People's Republic of China (PRC), a relaxation of currency controls to
allow the use of
dollars in China, permitting

American ships

to transport

Chinese goods, and allowing the

export of non-strategic items to the PRC. Nixon also stated that he was willing to
consider additional measures should events warrant. 100

The same day
China came

that

Nixon made

to a diplomatic climax.

that

announcement, the American team's

trip to

Chinese premier Zhou Enlai met with table tennis

delegations from Canada, Colombia, England, Nigeria, and the United States. In

conversations with each team,

Columbian team,

Zhou was extremely

the Chinese premier told

them

gracious. In speaking to the

that their

women's team should have

beaten the Chinese squad. For one American player, such remarks were too much:

"When

talking with the leader of the

saccharine that (to myself)

I

laughed

Zhou had important words
captain,

Zhou

American

said,

"What

a joy

it

Colombian delegation, the

my

head

for the

is

were so

101

off."

American team. Greeting the American team

to bring friends

friends have been in China.

pleasantries

from

You have made

afar.

In the past, a lot of

a start here in bringing more."

Nixon, 548 and "Statement by the President - April 14, 1971," Department of
State Bulletin (3 May 1971), 567-568.
101
"Premier Chou Meets Table Tennis Delegations of Canada, Colombia,
England, Nigeria, and United States," Peking Review 17 (23 April 1971) in Roderick
MacFarquhar, ed., Sino-American Relations, 1949-71 (New York: Praeger Publishers,
100

1972), 253; Bockenski, 174.

82

Later, the premier

made

a distinction in terms of relations between the
American people

and the Chinese people and relations between the two
governments:
players of China and the

US

There were surreal

" The
people

and

are friendly to each other." 102

moments during

the meeting

between Zhou and the American

team as well. Glen Cowan, the American player who had become
known
hair and flamboyant dress (he

wore purple bellbottoms

the Chinese premier about his impressions of the

to the

for his long

meeting with Zhou), asked

American hippie movement. Zhou

speculated that the youth of the United States were dissatisfied with the "peasant"
situation

was

and

same

the

were trying

that they

to seek out the truth through trying different things.

him when he was young, Zhou continued, explaining

for

movements were

not exclusive to the US.

was using exclusively and

the genius of what the Chinese

By eschewing

utilizing sport instead, the

and maximize potential gains

picked up on what was being done.

initiative to invite the

the

move was made

peoples.

As

the

US

to

An

table tennis

103

for China.

editorial in

US

Chinese government found a way of
in

order to minimize

The American media quickly

The Nation described the Chinese

team as one of public

relations "genius." Clearly,

improve understanding between the American and Chinese

American public warmed

government would have an increasingly

102

were

the traditional diplomacy that the

reaching out to the citizens rather than the governments of the West
potential dangers

such

103

With these comments, Zhou revealed
attempting to do with ping-pong.

that

in its

impressions of China, the

difficult

US

time maintaining a hostile relationship

"The Ping Heard Round the World," Time 97 (April 26, 1971), 26, 28.
Tim Boggan, "Chou, 73, and 'Team Hippie Hit It Off," New York Times

April 1971),

1

1,

It

16.

83

(1

with the Asian power. Given the nature of American
democracy, such understanding

between the peoples of both nations would lead
governments.

to better understanding

between the two

104

Fallout

America soon began
perspective.

to try to put the dramatic sporting events into proper

The New York Times analyzed

attempting by looking

at the

the significance of what the Chinese were

importance of table tennis in China, and

its

place as the

premier Chinese national sport, concluding that the invitation was that much more
important. Inviting the American team

national honor.

The equivalent would be

national baseball team to

come

to the

The American government
invitation

and came

for the

was

President

Nixon had

invited the Chinese

105

also considered the significance of the table tennis

Brief, the Director

of the media. In an April 14 State

of Intelligence Research wrote that the

part of a policy of "people's diplomacy," spearheaded

by Zhou. The goal

Chinese government was to improve the public opinion of China

pressure the

104
105

New

US.

if

to a conclusion very similar to that

Department Intelligence
invitation

was not simply a gesture of friendship, but one of

US

to soften

its

foreign policy.

106

"Ping Pong Anyone?" The Nation 212 (26 April 1971), 514.
Harrison E. Salisbury, "Ping ... Pong ... A New Approach to Diplomacy,"

York Times
106

government

in order to

(1

1

Ray Cline

April 1971), E3.
to Acting Secretary Irwin, Intelligence Brief,

"Communist-

14
China/US: Peking's People's Diplomacy: A ^New Page' in Sino- American Relations,"
Archive
April 1971, from "Kissinger's Secret Trip to China," National Security

(www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/#docs).
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Nixon was overjoyed with

President

and Zhou's remarks

in particular.

Two

the

American team's

visit to

China

in general

days after the historic meeting in Peking, Nixon

spoke before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. In his
speech, the President
stated that the

the

US

main goal of his administration was

the normalization of relations between

and the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the end of the PRC's

the world.

Nixon revealed

his personal

commitment

accomplishing these goals by

to

outlining a conversation he had recently had with his daughter.

hoped

that she

might have a chance

meet the people
sure if

it

there.

Nixon

to visit

would happen while he was

President

China herself and

also said that he too

isolation in

hoped

He had

told her that he

to see the great cities

to travel to China, but

and

was not

107

in office.

Nixon received wide

praise for his

commitment

to re-establishing

diplomatic relations with China. In a Life magazine editorial, the President's policies

were credited with being able

to

draw China out of its

isolation

and strengthening the

US

position with respect to the Soviet Union. Thanks to Nixon's efforts, the article stated,

could no longer be assumed by the Kremlin that the

US would

favor Russia over China in

a conflict. Additionally, Nixon's position as an anti-Communist Republican

American moves possible without seeming

to

come

it

made

out of weakness. Only then

the

was

the

stage set for ping-pong diplomacy.

The acclaim
than a

week

for

after the

Nixon's China policies was

team meeting with Zhou

conservatives within his

own

party.

far

from universal however. Less

Enlai, the President

The cracks

in the

came under

Republican facade

first

fire

from

appeared

"The President's Remarks at a Question and Answer Session with a Panel of
Bulletin (3 May 1971),
Six Editors and Reporters - April 16, 1971," Department of State
107

565-567.
108

"Reopening the Door

to China," Life

85

70 (30 April 1971), 52.

within the Administration

itself.

On

April 20, the

off-the-record meeting Vice President Spiro
that meeting, the

the positive

New

York Times ran a story about an

Agnew held

with eight reporters. During

Vice President expressed concern that China had gained too much from

manner

in

which the Chinese people's

spectacle of ping-pong diplomacy,

lives

were depicted. The whole

Agnew concluded, was

merely an attempt by China

to

exploit the United States. For that reason, he told reporters, he opposed closer ties with

China.

109

Although he

tried to rein in his vice president,

Nixon soon began

pressure from his right flank. Conservatives across the country

felt

betrayed by a president

stalwarts believed that

who

made

it

to feel additional

known

that they

they thought shared their values. These Republican

movement toward China

represented the straw that broke the

camel's back after the humiliation of the announcement of gradual withdrawal of

American troops from Vietnam, domestic wage and

and a push

price controls,

guaranteed incomes for the poor. There was even talk that William

F.

for

Buckley,

Jr.,

editor

of the conservative publication The National Review, would lead a group of eastern
conservatives in a campaign to "suspend" support from Nixon which in turn could lead to

a

GOP primary

challenger to Nixon's reelection.

In late April, The Christian Century

the

US

stood to gain from closer

109

RW Apple,

Jr.,

ties

111

110

called into question

what

benefits, if any,

with China. Ping-pong diplomacy, the magazine

"Agnew Voices Misgivings on

the

US-China 'Thaw'," New

York Times (20 April 1971) and Reeves, 317.
110

Reeves, 419.

The Christian Century was established in 1884 by the Christian Century
informing the
Foundation, a nonprofit and nondenominational organization, dedicated to
111

American public about "the events

that are defining religious life today."

(http://www.christiancentury.org/welcome.html)
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held,

was conducted on a timetable wholly

established by the Chinese,

everything. Furthermore, the cultural significance of
the
sinister intent.

Years

Mao

earlier,

accompaniment of ping pong
exhort Chinese team

to hit the ball "as if

In the end, the article concluded, ping-pong

traditional subversive style of

itself.

The only thing

the

US

stood to gain

revealed a far

more

said that he planned a revolution "to the

balls." Additionally,

members

game

who

Peking

it

officials

had been known

to

were the head of Chaing Kai-shek."

diplomacy represented a continuation of the

Chinese foreign

relations.

China was only looking out

for

could hope to gain was some insight into table tennis

techniques.

On May

The National Review ran an

4, 1971,

editorial

by William

F.

Buckley,

Jr.

attacking Nixon's China policy. In the piece, Buckley maintained that China continued
to represent a threat not only to the

US, but also

to the entire

Asian region.

If for

reason than the protection of Japan, the United States could not afford to soften

no other

its

policy

toward China.

It is

the further assumption of the Chinese that the best

Japan]
is,

is

to

coo a

little in

victory over the

important victories.

critical

American team

let

this [influence

at

They have found us easy

ping-pong

is

targets.

no doubt a precursor

up on Nixon's China policy.

Two weeks

of the President. The piece questioned

policy change given that the previous

Among

do

to

more

113

The magazine did not
another editorial

to

our direction - not officially, but through sports, which

for the communists, a paramilitary activity.

The

way

US

if

the time

hard-line policy had yielded

later,

was

good

it

ran

ripe for a

results.

these positive outcomes included protecting Nationalist forces on Taiwan,

112

"Backspin on the Chinese Serve," The Christian Century 88 (21 April 1971).

113

William

483.
F.

Buckley,

Jr.,

"The

New

1971), 497.

87

China," The National Review 23 (4

May

allowing them to develop a democratic society,
preventing China from spreading

communism
in 1950,

overseas to Chinese living abroad, keeping South Korea from
being overrun

and helping Japan from succumbing

Chinese domination. 114

to

In September The National Review ran an article under the
headline,

Conservative Looks

have come to

at

feel that

Nixon and China." The
Richard Nixon

is

author, Richard Brookhiser, wrote, "I

a Romantic, and that his attitude toward China

from a deep seated Romantic vision of politics."

rises

an individual

who

A Romantic,

his failure to see the entire diplomatic field

his overreaching foreign policy.

The

article

and

in the

Nixon
to

was

in this context,

could not conceive that there existed wicked nations

did not want peace. Brookhiser went on to unfavorably compare

Chamberlain for

"A Young

world who

to Neville

Woodrow Wilson

for

concluded with a hope that the Tricky Dick

of old would reassert himself, and not be blinded by Romanticism. 115

The scene

in the

policy toward China.

United States was mainly one of hope for the potential of a

Many Americans

steps to ease tensions between the

that

two

felt that

elements

who

all

was much

to

nations. Nixon, for his part,

even more could be accomplished during

however, that

there

new

be gained from taking

remained optimistic

his tenure as president. This

is

not to say,

praised ping-pong diplomacy. There remained significant conservative

believed that rather than making the world safer, bringing China into the

world community increased the potential

for danger.

Still,

the President, undaunted by

these criticisms, remained determined to go ahead with the policy he had outlined

many

years before in Foreign Affairs.

114

May

James Burnham, "China Policy: The Balance Sheet," The National Review (18

1971), 517-518.

Richard Brookhiser, "A Young Conservative Looks
National Review (24 September 1971), 1056, 1171-1073.
115

88

at

Nixon and China," The

Reaction
relations

to

ping-pong diplomacy had international repercussions.
Improving

between the United States and China had an impact not

nations, but

Union was
takeover

was

felt

around the world.

particularly hard

1950, the

in

the

1

USSR was

diplomacy could mean
It

hit.

for

terms of Cold

War diplomacy,

laving been an ally of China since the

understandably nervous about what

did not take long lor American media to realize

how China was
a delegation to

newsmen

treating the

Moscow

US

lor the

to their nation to play

and much

to gain.

two

the Soviet

Communist

this athletic

them.

American team might be perceived

lose

In

isolated to those

in

how

the Chinese invitation to

other nations. China

News Analysis

contrasted

and the USSR. Although the Chinese had refused
annual Party Congress, they had invited

games.

The

article

There was the potential

admittance to the United Nations, but above

concluded

that

US

all else,

the chance to

send

players and

Peking had

for diplomatic recognition

to

little

to

by the West,

make Moscow

nervous.

The

US

tried to reassure the Soviet

conference. White

to

1

Union publicly, however.

louse Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler said that the

In

an April 15 press

US was

not trying

embarrass or unduly pressure Russia. Chinese-American relations were unrelated

Soviet-US

relations.

calling the Peking

China.""

Still,

Ziegler

government

made an

effort to reinforce recent gains

the "People's Republic of

by again

China" rather than "Communist

7

116

"The

Paris

Commune

(

'hina

News Analysis 838

China,"

New

York limes (16 April

and Sino-Soviet Relations,"

(16 April 1971), 2.
117
Tcrrence Smith, "Soviet Assured by
1971),

to

1.

89

US on

It

China

appeared to some that the

US

had entered

that could be best described as "the

into a

new phase of relations

enemy of my enemy

leader Lenoid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin

made

to take place

US

April 22, the

New

condemned China
out to the

US

betraying

its

made some

of this, Russia would be

York Times reported that a

The Russian

friends in an effort to

The next day,

the

USSR

article

game.

to

It

make

just

118

UN
in."

8

foreign affairs weekly had

for assistance

slammed China

become an

on the outside looking

left

Communist Bloc

and

for reaching

for having a history of

international power. Although the

the

US

get

what

it

really wanted.

government attempted

US

had

the Soviets nervous

made good

-

that the

119

to reach out to Russia again.

Department press conference. Secretary Rogers

US

York Times

small steps, the Russian piece concluded, the Americans would not give in on

Taiwan and China would never

State

New

might support allowing China a seat on the

for not looking to the

instead.

new

withdraw from Vietnam; the two nations could

US

reach an agreement on Taiwan; the

On

Party Congress

based on a positive relationship between American and

speculated. China might help the

all

,h

this tension, if

China, there existed the potential for great diplomatic progress, the

Security Council. Through

friend." Soviet

statements at the 24

implying that Sino-Soviet relations were unsatisfactory. Given

developments were

my

is

with

reiterated that

US was

not playing

sense, the Secretary said, to have

Harry Schwartz, 'Triangular

Politics

good

and China,"

it

was not

some

sort

In a

the goal of

of political

relations with a nation of

New

York Times (19 April

1971), 37.
119

Theodore Shabad, "Soveit Denounces Chinese Reds For
With US," New York Times (22 April 1971). 12.

90

Shift

on Relations

700 million people.
conference

when he

Less than a week
said that the

later,

US was

Nixon

hit a similar

not trying to

irritate

wanted good relations with the Soviet Union as well and
peace to have Russia and China

The US continued

to

at

it

theme

at his

own

Russia. Rather, the

made

little

press

US

sense for world

each other's throats. 121

move toward China

as the

White House announced on

May

7 that steps had been taken to further improve trade between the two nations. The

Treasury Department
in transactions

lifted all

remaining restrictions on the dollar to allow

with the Chinese people and the Department of Commerce

the servicing of Chinese vessels by

Even with
itself

this

it

be used

to

lifted

bans on

American companies. 122

announcement, the Nixon Administration continued

to position

between China and the Soviet Union by reassuring the Soviets. On three separate

occasions that summer, President Nixon attempted to reach out to
that the motivation behind establishing positive relations with

with the

Moscow by

China had nothing

USSR,

but instead represented a desire to have friendly relations with

As

"Any

countries.

the President said on July 15,

reiterating

to

do

all

nation can be our friend without being

any other nation's enemy."

120

Bulletin (10
121

News Conference

"Secretary Rogers'

May

of April 23," Department of State

1971), 596.

"President Nixon's

News Conference of April

29," Department of State

Bulletin (17 April 1971), 633.

Regulations Announced on Trade With the People's Republic of China
702-704.
7, 1971," Department of State Bulletin (31 May 1971),
123
"President Nixon Briefs Editors and Publishers form Twelve Southern States
122

- May

"New

Department of State Bulletin (14 June 1971), 758-759; "President Nixon
- July 6, 1971,"
Briefs Media Executives From Thirteen Middle Western States
Department of State Bulletin (26 July 1971), 95-96; "President Nixon Announces
1971,"
Acceptance of Invitation to Visit People's Republic of China - July 15,

May

25, 1971,"

Department of State Bulletin

(2

August 1971), 121.
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One must

still

question the Nixon Administration's true motivations, even
in light

of these seemingly earnest pronouncements about the
purity of US intentions toward
China.

As mentioned

earlier, Secretary

of State Rogers had sent a

years before outlining the positive results the

could hope to achieve by improving

China eighteen months before Nixon's acceptance of an

relations with

to China.

US

memorandum two

Foremost of these was an attempt

to hurt Russia:

"Such an

invitation to travel

effort

would

also

serve our long-term interest of forestalling an eventual more fundamental rapprochement

USSR and

between the
innocence,

its

it

objectives

China."

124

So despite the Nixon Administration's pleas of

appears that the new, softer

US

- making

less certain

the Soviet

Union

policy toward China achieved at least one of

of its

own

security with respect to

both the United States and China.

Ping-pong made headlines across the United States following the Chinese
invitation.

returning

It

appeared that everyone wanted

home

In the public

to the

ceremony

there, the

US

their intent

emphasize what the

124

2,

Table Tennis Association made Nixon an honorary

would host a Chinese

the following year.

1

table tennis

25

allow the People's Republic to monopolize the issue, Taiwan sent

table tennis delegation to the

claimed that

US

that the organization

delegation on a tour of the

to

be associated with the game. After

United States, the American team was called to the White House.

member and announced

Not

to

US

was

US

in

August 1971.

and the Chinese nationalists

Communism,

still

had

in

in

an effort

1969" (Document 308), in Duncombe, 800.
125
"Table-Tennis Group Enrolls the President,"

92

New

to

common. Said Chuin-

Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon,

75.

own

A religious team, the Taiwanese

to spread Christianity, not

"Memorandum from

its

York Times (3

December

May

1971

),

Hui Nee, a 22-year old team member,

"We

couldn't understand

how

a democratic

country like the United States could have anything to do
with the totalitarian regime on
the mainland."

However, the

US

claiming that having invited the
Nationalists

Instead, the

first.

college teams.

national

PRC to

team refused

America,

it

Taiwanese squad had

to play the visiting

would have been an
to

Taiwanese,

insult to play the

be satisfied competing against

126

Internationally, other nations attempted to follow the ping-pong diplomatic path

and used the game

Commerce, Jean

to

make

foreign policy statements. In October, French Secretary for

Bailly, signaled his country's rekindled friendship with

China by

playing a table tennis match against Chinese Minister for Foreign Trade, Pai Hsian-Kuo

onboard a Chinese ship

announced
official

had

that

it

sent to

initial

to

meet with Zhou

role of ping-pong

left

(NCUSCR), an

behind by the

new US

fully sealed

in April 1972, a

The Chinese team was sponsored by

that the

team was being

128

policy.

almost exactly a year after the

Chinese table tennis team visited the

the National

US

Committee on United States-China

educational organization established in 1966 to improve

American understanding of China. The

126

Enlai. Analysts at the time noted that Thailand

diplomacy was

Chinese invitation, when

Relations

The following August, Thailand

been staunchly anti-Communist, but speculated

China out of fear of being

The

127

too would be sending a table tennis team to China and that a Thai

was expected

traditionally

in Marseilles harbor.

NCUSCR financed the visit through

"Victorious Taiwan Table-Tennis

Team on Tour of US

is

Armed With

Bibles

and Paddles," New York Times (31 August 1971), 9.
127
"High Level Table Tennis," New York Times (7 October 1971), 5.
128
Table
Bernard Gwertzman, "Thai Official is Expected to Meet Chou On
3.
Tennis Team's Trip to Peking," New York Times (9 August 1972),

93

,h
contributions from such individuals as John D.
Rockefeller 4
Frank Sinatra, and John
,

McCone,

the former head of the CIA. 129

During

its

three-week

stay, the

Chinese team visited a number of sites across the

United States and held demonstration matches for interested
spectators. They toured a
Chrysler plant in Detroit, playing against employees and invited
United Auto Workers
president Leonard

match

to

come

United Nations followed.

at the

the General

Woodcock

Assembly chamber, but

to China.

130

Initially, the

the matches

A trip to New
plan

was

York and an exhibition

for the

DC

for another meeting, this time with

Mickey Mouse. Reporters noted

Chinese shook hands with many characters

mouse.

The team then

meet with President Nixon before moving on

to

in

were moved when objections were

raised about the appropriateness of holding a sporting event there. 131

stopped in Washington,

Chinese to play

to California

that although the

in Disneyland, they all recognized the iconic

132

The Chinese team was
the States.

On

fully

aware of their purpose and the significance the

the eve of leaving China,

Song Shung,

trip to

the acting president of the Table

Tennis Association of China, told reporters,

The United

States table tennis delegation visit to our country last April has

strengthened understanding and friendship between the peoples of China and the

United

States.

United States

The Chinese table tennis delegation
133
with this same desire.

shall return the visit to the

129

Kathleen Teltsch, "A 'Warm Reception' Promised to Chinese Table Tennis
Team," New York Times (2 February 1972), 2.
130
Jerry M. Flynt, "China's Table Tennis Smash in Detroit," New York Times (14
April 1971),
131

2.

Murry Schumach, "China's Table Tennis Team

York Times (20 April 1971),
132
133

Times (22

Visits City, Plays at

UN," New

1.

"Team Meets Mickey Mouse," New York Times (27 April 1971), 24.
York
"Chinese Table Tennis Team Set to Begin Tour of US April 10," New
March 1971), 40.
94

After arriving in the US, the Chinese went
out of their

way

not to humiliate their hosts

during matches. Although they could
have easily beaten the Americans, they worked to

keep matches
is

As one Chinese

close.

permanent."

player said, "Winning

temporary, but friendship

is

134

Perspective

The diplomatic breakthrough
due

to both

US

and Chinese

efforts.

in

Sino-American relations

in the early

Richard Nixon came to the White House believing

strongly about the need to reach out to the Asian power. His overtures
were
traditional diplomatic tools

- through

the lifting of trade, currency, and other

sanctions. But while these measures signaled

welcome

signal that there

to

economic

engage China and

force within

was something more than economics motivating them.

Nixon found a willing collaborator

In China,

Mao's regime, Zhou believed

to signal

its

important force in

that the

American willingness

made with

the nation back into the world community, they lacked a feeling of personal

warmth - a

be able

1970s was

that

own

right.

that

134

it

to

in

Long

to the

him and

in finding

US, China would

Steve Cady, "Chinese

and sport

in general

made

Go Easy on US, Win

Times (21 April 1971), 29.

95

itself as

an

the

an unconventional

risk.

tennis within Chinese society and the

in particular

a moderating

both recognizing the opportunity

promised dramatic gains with minimal

The place of table
of

Enlai.

by reaching out

Zhou's genius was

Nixon Administration had presented

traditional use

Zhou

independence from the Soviet Union and establish

its

way of responding

in

Communist regime's

game

a unique tool.

Table Tennis, 4-1,"

New

As we

York

have seen, and
States

the

was

will discuss further, the

far different

US was

from

how

it

way

in

was seen

which sport was viewed

in the

Communist world. For

United

that reason,

caught completely off guard when the diplomatic
breakthrough they had long

searched for came in the area of athletics rather than
trade.
to the

in the

By

relegating sports merely

realm of recreation, America had reduced the opportunity

diplomatic tool during the Cold War. China placed sport
establishment, and, therefore,

was

able to

more

to use

at the center

it

of its

state

easily recognize the diplomatic

opportunity that the 1971 World Table Tennis Championships presented.

96

as a valuable

CONCLUSION

On

the whole, the United States merits a

mixed evaluation

in

terms of the

diplomatic use of athletics during the Cold War. In Cuba, the Eisenhower
and Kennedy
administrations completely missed the boat by not recognizing the value of baseball
to

maintain a measure of relations with Castro. Effectively, the

regime by taking
the

Cuban people

its

ball

and bat home and refusing

to

was poor

to play. In light

decision.

Much more

could have been gained by

to participate in the International

for Nixon, although he

was a

Chinese table tennis squad

made

to the

US

for a tour of their

in

League.

reactor rather than an initiator in the

ping-pong diplomacy, he deserves praise for coming around

gains

of the willingness of

an understanding with Castro whereby the Sugar Kings would have stayed

Cuba and would have continued

As

responded to the Castro

as a whole, and Castro in particular, to continue to engage the United

Stats through baseball, this

coming

US

in the

game of

end by inviting the

own. In doing

so,

he sealed the

not only by his earlier lifting of trade and travel sanctions on China, but the

American team's

visit to

China

in the spring

of 1971

metaphor for what Zhou and Nixon were able

to

.

Ping-pong serves as an apt

accomplish - being willing

to step

the table, engage each other, and bounce diplomatic balls back and forth.

In examining the missed potential of baseball in

Revolution and the way in which China took the
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Cuba following

initiative in

the 1959

using table tennis to

up

to

reestablish productive relations with the United
States in 1971, the question that arises

why

US

the

failed to look at sports as a diplomatic tool during
the

Cold War.

There are

several reasons for this: the perceived negative
result of participation in the 1936

Olympics; the nature of American
of athletics within

US

politics during the

Cold War; and the

is

Bed in

traditional role

society. All three of these factors conspired to prevent

US

political

leaders and foreign policy elites from seriously considering using
sports to either

maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba or to reestablish positive

Through studying
historical

memory of the

the

Cold War,

failure

the defining diplomatic

of the

in

War had on

key policy-making positions

allies to effectively deal

moment of their

with China.

impossible to overestimate the impact that

events leading up to the Second World

of American foreign policy. For many

government, the

it is

ties

the direction

in the

US

with Adolph Hitler early on was

formative years.

Many of these

political leaders

looked back on the 1936 Olympic Games with regret for not preventing the German
leader's advance.

to

Having been chosen the

site for the

power, Berlin was the focus of much controversy

Alarmed

at the nature

of the Fascist government

many

other nations debated whether or not

teams

to the

Games. On one

side,

it

its

after the

in central

Hitler's rise

Nazi takeover of Germany.

Europe, the United States and

was appropriate

many argued

approval of Hitler's government and

Olympics years before

to

send their Olympic

that sending their squads

would imply

ideology. Others, however, maintained that the

of sportsmanship, and that the purity of the

Olympics represented a higher

ideal

would not be compromised by

the Nazi regime.

Games

1

Richard D. Mandell, The Nazi Olympics (New York: The Macmillan Company,
The Nazi Olympics: Sport,
1971), 275-293; Arnud Kruger and William Murry, eds.,
University of Illinois Press, 2003).
Politics, and Appeasement in the 1950s (Urbana:
1
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In the end, those favoring participation in
the Berlin

was no boycott of the Games. However,
correct, as

inspiring

Olympics won

and there

out,

Hitler proved the opponents of participation

he manipulated the competition into a showcase for

his

government. Even the

and heroic performance by the US's Jesse Owens, an African-American

and long jumper, was not enough

American journalists claimed
performances
superiority,

As

in track

and

winning gold

the 1936

to fully blunt the

US

that the

field

and

German

in diving,

athletes displayed their athletic

and bronze

2

in 30.

to a close, Hitler told reporters that universal

participation by the rest of the world

widespread acceptance of its

Although

had "won" the 1936 games on the strength of

in 33 events, silver in 26,

Games came

Nazi leader's message.

sprinter

showed

policies.

Even

the correctness of his

if

government and the

the athletic world's presence in Berlin did

not necessarily signal universal accommodation with the racist and anti-Semitic nature of
the Nazi regime, as historian Allen

Guttmann

writes, "... thousands

of visitors

left

Berlin

with a sense of aesthetic fulfillment and a vague impression that National Socialism

wasn't as dreadful as they had thought."

Looking back on the Berlin Olympics
the United States concluded that

it

in the aftermath

had been a mistake

to

go

of World

to the '36

public protests to the contrary, actions spoke louder than words, and

deny

that sending

went ever

2

American team signaled

tacit

A

3

Ibid., 67.
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many

in

Games. Despite

was

difficult to

Some

from the Olympics encouraged

History of the

University of Illinois Press, 2002), 69.

II,

acceptance of Hitler's regime.

farther to conclude that the success derived

Allen Guttmann, The Olympics:

it

War

Modern Games (Chicago:

later

it

Nazi policies of aggression. 4 Given these lessons
learned from the 1936 Olympics,

becomes

easier to understand

why American

leaders were hesitant during the Cold

to use sports as a diplomatic tool with the
Soviet bloc

- there was

a nagging belief that

engagement would imply an acceptance of Communist ideology by

athletic

In a similar vein, the nature of domestic politics during the
Cold

contributed to the hesitance to use sport diplomatically.
threat of the Soviet

to

mind,

was enough

War

further

the expansion of Communism around the world had risen

to destroy the electoral viability

soft foreign policy

toward

of any politician. With that

and candidates competed against each other

political parties

the West.

the mid-1950s, the perceived

such a fevered pitch that merely the perception of having a

the Soviet Bloc

in

Union and

By

War

to

prove

who was

tougher on communism. During the 1952 presidential race, Dwight Eisenhower
attributed the fall of China to

Truman and
President

As

Communist

eight years later John F.

Nixon of being

stated earlier, having

Kennedy could

ill

forces to the foreign policy of President

Kennedy took

a similar path

when he accused Vice

part of the Administration that presided over the fall of Cuba.

won

election at least in part

afford to back

down

in his policy

on a get-tough-on-Castro platform,

toward the

island.

In this way, the specter of communism served to poison the

American

environment during the Cold War. Out of fear of being perceived as

Communist
start.

It

threat, policies

would have been

5

soft

political

on the

of accommodation with Cuba were discounted from the very

politically difficult for

Kennedy

to allow continued

4

Mandell, 275-293.

5

Herbert Parmet, JFK: The Presidency ofJohn F. Kennedy

Press, 1983), 45.
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(New York: The

Dial

participation of

American

courageous and done

so,

it

athletes in

is

Cuban

I

Inited Stales

two

and Cuba might not appear

between the two nations,

interaction could have existed while

it

is

still

worth

at least a

political credibility

State

travel.

It

Given American perception of sport,

The way

in

Still,

methods

does not appear

Department ever considered using

considering ways

that

athletics as a

this oversight is

face.

reach out to the

as

Nixon

Communist

that they

anyone

way

to

officials

worked

to

chose were exclusively

in the

make

White

1

louse or

a breakthrough.

8

perhaps not surprising.

which the American public perceived sports during

greatly contributed to the failure of the

which some

in

being completely destroyed because of his

reestablish diplomatic relations with China, the

realm of trade and

first

the resulting four-plus decades

in a position to

strong background of being tough on the Soviet bloc. 7

in the

connection

measure of positive

allowing each side to save

Unlike Kennedy, Nixon found himself

Bloc without fear of his

at least

a

be hugely significant on

to

communication between Americans and Cubans. Given
hostility

he had been

Although such

nations.

glance, baseball could have been used to maintain

of

if

possible that an athletic relationship might have
served as a

bridge, if only a small one, between the

between the

However,

baseball."

US government

to

the

Cold War

recognize the potential of

h

Kennedy faced strong domestic pressure from significant segments of the
American population to be tough on Castro's regime. Besides fighting against an image
of being too young and loo soft to effectively stand against the threat of Communism, the
Cuban-American community was quickly becoming an important political bloc in south
Florida.
7

During Nixon's early years

in politics as a

member of the

I

louse of

Representatives, he established a reputation for having strong anti-Communist
credentials. For more, sec Richard Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the While House.

examination of Foreign Relations of the United States and the Department of
American
State Bulletin reveals intense Administration discussions of how to signal
lowcver, at no point was sport mentioned
willingness to improve relations with China.
s

An

1

as a tool in this effort.

101

athletics in diplomacy.

In the United States, sports were, and
have continued to be,

primarily a private-sector industry. While
there are
politicians,

who

many Americans,

are passionate about athletics, sport

including

on the whole has never been directed

from above by the government. With very few
exceptions, sports have always been
private, regional ventures, pitting the

team of one

city or state against that

of another.

National teams have always held secondary importance to
professional clubs, with the
possible exception of the quadrennial Olympics.

The place of sport

in socialist nations

contrast to the United States.

vitally important

9

during the Cold

For Communist nations during

ways through which

the viability

War provides

a sharp

this period, athletics

were

and correctness of their regimes could

be proven to the world. Countries such as China, the Soviet Union, and East Germany
put large amounts of time, effort, and

money

into national teams,

as penultimate of athletic achievement. These nations

their national identity

Communist
were one

and took pride

nations, athletic success

in the same.

in their success

was not

10

In this light, that

which were put forward

saw these squads

on the international

as extensions of

stage.

For

peripheral to national self-perception

Zhou

many

- they

Enlai chose table tennis to signal China's

willingness to improve diplomatic relations with the

US

while such an option never

appeared to have occurred to President Nixon reveals a great deal about the place of sport
in

both Chinese and

US

cultures.

For more on the contrast of the role of athletics in US culture and its place in
Cuban society, see Eric A. Wagner, "Sport in Revolutionary Societies: Cuba and
Nicaragua," in Joseph L. Arbena, ed., Sport and Society in Latin America: Diffusion,
9

Dependency, and the Rise of Mass Culture (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988),
122.
10

Sports in China (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1973).
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1

19-

What, then, arc the lessons
f irst,

it

to bo learned

from our studies of Cuba and China?

important to recognize the extent to which the
Cold

is

and

politics in the United States.

that

it

The perceived

threat

War

influenced policies

of the Soviet Bloc was so great

precluded politicians from even considering certain
policy paths

made them appear weak

in the

that

might have

eyes of the public or their political opponents. The power

of the Cold War, coupled with the relegation of sport

to a

secondary place

in

American

society, conspired to limit the diplomatic tools available to
foreign policy elites to
traditional

measures such as trade and

Additionally,

we have

travel restrictions.

seen the power and potential of sport

diplomacy. In

in

Cuba, we saw the passion with which the Cuban people followed baseball, not only
domestically but

in the

I

fnited States as well."

desire to keep the Sugar Kings in

toehold

in

This passion

Havana could have been used by

Cuba, even as formal diplomatic

could have been conducted on two levels

tics

game and

for the

were severed.

the

In this

US

to

Castro's

maintain a

way, diplomacy

the formal level of State Department-directed

policy of severing relations with the Castro regime, and an informal athletic track of

working

to preserve a positive presence

In China,

athletics,

and

competition.

and

travel

American

1

12

we saw

how much

12

the extent to

stock

on the

island in the form of baseball.

which the Communist government directed

was placed

in the

success of their teams

For these reasons, Zhou's response

to President

Nixon's

bans not with economic measures, but with an invitation

athletes to visit

China and compete

in table tennis

lifting

for a

matches

Beezley, 20.

Sports in China (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1973).
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in international

is

of trade

group of young

understandable.

Still, this

was a response

that

Nixon never expected. 13

In taking such an action, the

Chinese were able to make the diplomatic breakthrough
between the two nations more
dramatic

in the

eyes of the international community as a whole in a way
that an

announcement of increased
Given these

trade never

situations,

would have.

had the United States worked

countries athletically, the repercussions would have been

to

engage either or both

felt far

beyond the playing

field.

Sport could have been used to establish diplomatic relations, which would
have been

mutually beneficial. In the end,

this

should be the ultimate goal for American diplomacy

in the world.

Finally, this study underscores the need for diplomats to maintain a willingness to

consider unconventional diplomatic methods. Doing so presents opportunities for great
gains with minimal risks. If a sporting overture
separation from

at the

and

same

it

and can plausibly

time, if such an opening

will be considered a

much

state that

is

is

rejected, a nation has a natural

such a rejection

accepted,

it

will

make

is

not a direct affront. But

headlines around the world

greater success than a comparable

Although the Cold War has been over

for

economic opening.

more than a decade, we can hope

that future

diplomats will keep their minds open to sport as a tool for international relations.

13

news.

I

As Nixon wrote

in his

We

"I

was

as surprised as

I

was pleased by

this

China initiative would come to fruition in the form of
immediately approved the acceptance of the invitation," Nixon,

had never expected

a Ping-Pong team.

memoirs,

that the

548.
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